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ABSTRACT
La survivance has traditionally played a central role
in Quebec politics, and while the international relations of
Quebec can be viewed as part of this general historical pat
tern, it is also a particular response to modern technolo
gical conditions. Indeed, it is primarily because of these
latter conditions that international relations has become
somewhat of a cultural imperative for Quebec. Moreover, given
the changes in its political and governmental processes,

it

was logically inevitable that Quebec should seek to establish
such transnational relations. In attempting to conduct these
relations, however, Quebec has posed several serious problems
for the federal government.
One purpose of this thesis is to examine, in the light
of cultural theory, the historical and present attempts by
Quebec to ensure the integrity of the French Canadian
cultural-national community. This examination reveals important changes over time s firstly, prime responsibility for

cultural-national preservation has shifted from the Church to
the State; secondly, there has occurred, in the post-war
period, a redefinition of the means and ends of la survivance;
thirdly, both previous changes were prompted by modern tech
nological developments.
The second purpose of this thesis is to examine the in
ternational relations of Quebec. Quebec's governmental pro
cess has reflected the post-war redefinition which favoured
- iii -
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policies of extroversion. The international relations of
Quebec is part of that reflection. In terms of federalprovincial relations, it is also part of Quebec’s attempt to
ensure maximum autonomy in areas of provincial jurisdiction.
However, the constitutional and political problems which
arise from Quebec’s international relations are so grave,
and so fundamental to the Canadian federal system, that solu
tions to them have not yet been found.
By demonstrating an essential and logical relationship
between Quebec's international relations and the preservation
and development of its cultural-national community, this
thesis endeavours to explain why, in spite of the politicoconstitutional stalemate, Quebec continues to conduct
transnational relations.

IV
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PREFACE

The patriotic enthusiasm which marked Canada's centenary
was tempered, by a serious reassessment of national values and
goals. Providing a dramatic impetus for that reassessment was
the warning of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and
Biculturalism, that,
...Canada, without being fully conscious of the fact,
is passing through the greatest crisis in its history...
...a time when decisions must be taken and developments
must occur leading either to its break-up, or to a new
set of conditions for its future existence...(Prelimi
nary Report, p. 13 and 133).
The solution to problems of majority-minority rights, of deux
nations, of associate-state and special-status concepts, and
of constitutional review, necessitated an examination and
understanding of the aspirations and politics of Québécois.
T h u s , since the mid-1960's, much has been written on the
politics of Quebec. The reassessment in both English- and
French-speaking Canada continues.
This particular study was undertaken in light of that
continuing national reassessment. Hopefully, it will contri
bute to the growing body of literature on the politics of
Quebec, and thereby further the understanding by English
Canadians of their French-speaking confrères. Only by such
repeated and reciprocal attempts at understanding will the
chances for Canada's future and harmonious existence prevail.

In the preparation of this work, much valuable

V
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assistance and encouragement were given by Dr. Walter L.
White, my thesis director. His time and efforts are greatly
1
appreciated. As well, I wish to express my indebtedness to
Dr. E, Donald Briggs whose advice on matters of content and
presentation were both pertinent and helpful. Gerard A.
Lemieux, Assistant Professor of French Language and Litera
ture, was the third member of my thesis committee. His
familiarity with the French Canadian psyche was an essential
contribution for which I am most grateful. Separately,

each

member of my committee donated an important element; to
gether, they provided a stimulating intellectual environment
wherein my ideas could grow and this thesis proceed.
In addition, I wish to express my appreciation to Mrs.
S.L. Kelly for her typing assistance.
Lastly, I would be sorely remiss were I not to mention
Karen. When completion of the thesis seemed so distant, my
wife's unceasing reassurance was my source of determination.
With that in mind, I dedicate this work to her.
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INTRODUCTION

Preservation of the French Canadian cultural-national
community has always played a predominant role in the
politics of Quebec. It lies near the heart of every issue.
University grants, fiscal autonomy, linguistic rights can
all be traced, in the final analysis, to a cultural root.
Particularly in federal-provincial, Ottawa-Quebec relations,
issues are more often than not cast in English-French,
majority-minority terms.
The international relations of Quebec, while a rela
tively recent and controversial phenomenon, is part of this
long-standing pattern. Indeed, not only is it part of that
pattern but, given the circumstances within and outside
contemporary Quebec, it is an essential element. Further
more, in light of this essential relationship between
cultural-national preservation and the international rela
tions of Quebec, the latter*s emergence as a problem-issue
was logical, if not inevitable.

Within Quebec, the state has gradually assumed a more
active and positive role. Its assumption of cultural re
sponsibilities, formerly vested exclusively in the Church,
was accompanied by the post-war redefinition of the means
and ends of cultural-national survival (la survivance), a
redefinition whereby the Church's traditional,

-

1

defensive

-
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policies involving isolation were rejected in favour of a
decisively extroverted and secular approach. Moreover,
within the present atmosphere favouring intervention, the
state is determined to exercise fully its legislative and
administrative responsibilities as defined by the British
North America Act.
However, changes within Quebec have occurred simulta
neously with those of its global environment. Penetrative
communications, a result of modern technology, have opened
Quebec to the numerically overwhelming, English-speaking
North American community. Assimilative pressures are there
fore brought to bear. Yet these networks of communication
have, in turn, facilitated Quebec contacts with other
francophone societies.
Technology has also effected a change in both the
conduct and the content of international relations t the
presence of informal international actors has markedly in
creased; likewise, the treatment of issues of general
social welfare - which in Canada fall largely within pro
vincial jurisdiction - is much more frequent.
From the standpoint of cultural theory, the combination
and interaction of these internal and external circumstances
seem to make international relations a necessity for
Quebec's cultural-national survival. Theories of culture
suggest that the maintenance and healthy development of any
cultural-national community necessitate an equilibrium
between the forces of stability and the forces of non-
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assimilative change. The endogenous temporal, and the dif
fusive spacial, transmissions of culture are therefore
equally imperative. By the mid-1960*s, Quebec had effective
ly institutionalized the temporal transmission of culture
when it created the Department of Education, but this was
only partial insurance against cultural assimilation.
Assimilative forces exerted by the anglophone culture's
size and ease of penetration cannot be forestalled by
Quebec alone. Extra-societal, francophone (ie. non-assimilative) reinforcement is needed.
Therefore, given the external pressures upon Quebec's
cultural-national survival, and thus the internal pressures
upon the state to intervene, it was inevitable that the
Quebec government should seek to institutionalize the spa
cial transmission of culture, by establishing relations
with francophone societies abroad. It was all the more in
evitable given Quebec's non-acceptance of Ottawa as a
faithful representative of the French Canadian culture.

In pursuing this hypothesis - that there exists a
logical and essential relationship between Quebec's cul
tural-national survival and its international relations the aforementioned areas will be studied in depth. To place
the entire question within a proper perspective, the work
will proceed with some theoretical considerations of the
components and processes of culture, how these are related
to the socio-political concepts of nation and of state.
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and how technology affects each one. Against this theoreti
cal background the practical, political experience of Que
bec will be examined. The Church's ideology of survival,
the re-orientation of the political process, and the
emergence of new policies for cultural preservation are
included.
The second chapter of this study provides a detailed
review of Quebec's international activities, focusing on
the 1960 's. It is both an historical account of Quebec's
emergence upon the external plane and a measure of its pre
sent involvement there. While it does not encompass
entirely all phases of Quebec's transnational relations,

it

is an attempt to record, as comprehensively as possible,
the major domestic and international confrontations and
developments in which both Ottawa and Quebec are key actors.
The chapter concludes by relating changes in the govern
mental process which effectively established an interna
tional role for Quebec, to the previously mentioned changes
in the political process.
The third chapter consists of three parts each of
which is an expansion of the salient and sometimes diverse
points of view advanced by the major disputants, Ottawa
and Quebec. The first section briefly covers the legal,
constitutional arguments in which Ottawa appears, to this
author at least, to enjoy a decisive advantage. The second
and third parts centre on Quebec's political and cultural
arguments respectively. They express Quebec's need and
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desire to conduct international relations and thus form the
basis for understanding that government's actions.
The conclusion reviews and draws together the various
elements discussed in an attempt not only to confirm the
hypothesis, but also to treat the subject, the international
relations of Quebec, as a contemporary political problem.

In so far as the international relations of Quebec
remains a political problem,

it threatens, in Atkey's words,

"not only the internal maintenance of the Canadian federa
tion, but the position of the federation in the interna
tional community" (The Confederation Challenge, vol. 2, p.
153)* Any study of that problem is therefore of consider
able relevance. It is hoped that by placing this contem
porary, controversial subject within a cultural, rather
than the all too often legal-constitutional, context, a
much needed dimension may be added. This dimension, the
author hopes, will provide a broader understanding of the
problem.
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CHAPTER I
CULTURE AND POLITICS
Culture, Nation and State *
Some Theoretical Considerations
Since "culture" occupies a fundamental position with
in the hypothesis, the bounds of that term must be made
clear. The author therefore will attempt to establish a
concept

of culture which is at once relevant, and appli

cable to a particular situation.

Whatever else might distinguish Man from other animals,
culture is certainly the most crucial aspect. Moreover,
because Man, unlike other animals, has few if any instinc
tive skills and no instinctive knowledge which might enable
him to sustain himself, either singly or in groups, culture
is essential %
...it provides the knowledge and the techniques that
enable Man to survive, both physically and socially,
and to master and control, insofar as it is possible,
the world around hi m . ..(Chinoy, p. 4?).
1
The use of "concept" over "definition" expresses the
author *s bias toward the grasping rather than the pin
pointing of an idea or term. Where little consensus exists
despite a myriad of definitions, as in the case of "culture",
this approach proves useful. Kroeber agrees t
...What culture is can be better understood from know
ledge of what forms it takes and how it works than by
a definition. Culture is in this respect like life or
matter t it is the total of their varied phenomena
that is more significant than a concentrated phrase
about them...(p. 60 ),

_

6

-
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Culture is thus the special and exclusive product of
Man, embodying at once those characteristics of a "rational"
and of a "social" animal. For Man lives in two worlds

t

he

is part of nature, and part of the man-made world within
which he himself is socialized. Through his capacity to
reason, Man creates out of the natural conditions of his
existence, a social world - a social network of activities
(be they political, economic, religious or otherwise) which
"constitute Man's most sophisticated attempts to realize
the potentialities of his own nature" (Verene, p. 2), It is
culture which epitomizes Man's creative interaction with
his natural and social environments;

it is culture which

enables Man to structure these relationships, to order his
own existence.
Culture therefore integrates Man's total environment,
and thus, according to Quebec's Royal Commission of Inquiry
2
on Constitutional Problems , the purpose or object of
culture can be stated as t
...the systematic, balanced, hierarchic "valorization"
of (Man's) complex potentialities with a view to his
completest fulfilment and the fullest fruition of his
existence...(vol. 2, p. ?).
Yet the essence of culture is its social nature. In
deed, it has been stated that culture is to the group what
personality is to the individual (Royal Commission on Bi
lingualism and Biculturalism; Report, vol. 1, p. xxxixxxii). While this may be a fine and somewhat contentious

Hereafter cited as the Tremblay Report.
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point,

it nevertheless underscores the close relationship

between society and culture.
Man, as previously mentioned, substitutes knowledge
and technique for his lack of animal instinct, and uses his
faculties of oral and literal communication to survive. Man
is thus a "time-binding" animal, in the sense that "he
binds time by transcending it, through influencing other
generations by his actions" (Kroeber, p. 8). Therefore
culture (the totality of technique for environmental mas
tery), being both learned and shared, necessitates men to
continue the learning and sharing process; otherwise,
culture will be neither created nor maintained. This is
M a n ’s distinction. Human beings are designated as such pre
cisely because they are animals with the ability to create
for themselves a culture »
...so far as Man is concerned, culture always has
society as a counterpart; it rests on, and is carried
by, society. Beyond the range of Man there are societies
but no cultures. Cultural phenomena thus characterize
Man more specifically than his social manifestations
characterize him, for these latter he shares with ver
tebrate and invertebrate animals...(Kroeber, p. 61).
Thus we have come full-circle

t

culture, embodying

both the rational and social natures of Man, allows him to
master and structure his total environment - not only in
order to survive, but to realize his individual and group
potentials as well.

From the perspective of content, culture is composed
of, or encompasses, three basic elements * knowledge.
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values, and means of expression . The first of these com
ponents, knowledge, embraces the whole vast body of ideas
by which men account for their observation and experience,
and which they take into account or rely upon in choosing
alternative lines of action. It encompasses all forms of
cognition and is thus an essential cultural component t
...In its principle as in its process of development,
culture is primarily knowledge, the acquisition and
mastery of learning, and the shaping, for that purpose,
of the intelligence and other faculties of the mind...
(Tremblay Report, vol. 2, p. 8 ).
Values, on the other hand, are the standards and
ideals by which men define their goals, regulate their in
teraction with society, and judge themselves and others.
They are general precepts to which men give their alle
giance; they are learned and they are shared. Attitudes of
approval and disapproval,

judgments of good or bad, desir

able or undesirable - toward specific persons, things.
3

There is as much consensus regarding the components of
culture, as there is regarding its definition. Frequently
quoted is T y l o r ’s I 87 I enumeration t
...Culture...is that complex whole which includes
knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any
other capabilities■acquired by Man as a member of
society...(as quoted in Chinoy, p. 46; Merkl, p. 40;
and Kroeber, p. 60 ).
Each writer submits his own list reflecting, as is natural,
his personal prejudices or interests. Leslie White's divi
sion, for example, includes four sectors of culture - ideo
logical, sociological, sentimental or attitudinal, and
technological (Hammond, p. 48). Each sector is strongly
dependent upon M a n ’s symbolic faculty. While this is surely
an acceptable social science orientation, it tends toward
proliferation, whereas simplification is more desirable.
This particular tri-component description which is bor
rowed from the Tremblay Report (vol. 2, p. 8 ), represents
the essence of most other attempts. All this only serves
to emphasize the "basic" nature of these three elements.
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situations, and events - all have as their common root,
values. In this connection, values and knowledge are inter
dependent, as the former shares with the latter a strong
hearing on the concept of culture

t

...Values are the criteria of appreciation, the norms
according to which Man judges, not knowledge itself...
but the use to be made of knowledge. In terms of
values, branches of knowledge are chosen and classified
according to their respective purposes and ordered for
life. The sense of values is the integrating principle,
the very soul of culture...(Tremblay Report, vol. 2,
p. 9).
The acquisition, progress, and mere existence of cul4
ture depends upon the third element, means of expression .
In all its parts and aspects, culture relies upon M a n ’s
symbolic faculty, or, more specifically, upon articulate
speech. Thus language comes to hold a principal position
within the cultural concept. Language is the necessary in
strument of culture,

just as communication generally is a

fundamental aspect of social life and processes. It is the
vital link by which all is learned and shared.
From the foregoing it is evident that culture is made
up of a collection of organic components. While each con
stituting element has its own special purpose, together
they are mutually dependent. Knowledge, values and means of
4

While "means of expression" is here treated in rela
tion to M a n ’s ability to communicate in a symbolic manner,
primarily through the use of language, it may also refer to
material things (instruments, machinery, works of art,
books, etc.). There exists a fine line, however, between
the means of expression and the expression itself, and such
cultural artifacts may be considered as either. But since
material objects usually appear as products of a culture,
they are not treated here as "means of expression".
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expression âre essential to each other, but even more to
the whole; and that whole, culture, while itself a syn
thesis, provides for Man (individually and collectively)
both order and synthesis. In short, it defines his exis
tence.

In its processes, culture is basically social. Commu
nication and society are the sine qua n o n . For culture to
exist, to grow, to attempt to fulfil its purposes, the
transmission of culture is therefore essential.
This transmission of culture may be either temporal or
spacial, or even - and it is today more the rule than the
exception - a combination of both. Temporal transmission
reflects the "social heritage” aspects of culture (Linton,
p. 69 -79 ). It flows from tradition, from an accumulation
of ancestral or generational cognitive, evaluative and ex
pressive ideas, adapted over time for reasons of survival
in its varied forms. It is a handing-down, a sharing of
experience from the old to the young;

it is a process of

regeneration and of socialization. In this sense, temporal
transmission tends toward the persistence, strengthening
and stability of a culture, and the mother-tongue serves as
its most effective instrument.
While temporal transmission resists so far as it is
possible (and/or desirable) extra-cultural influences,
spacial transmission, because it is primarily a process of
cultural diffusion, promotes change. Here, the acceptance
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of foreign elements and systems constitutes a geographical
spread; and the cultural content of foreign origin which
gradually accumulates,

is normally quite high within any

given culture. Furthermore, once the new cultural element
is smoothly integrated within a culture, its source becomes
forgotten and irrelevant. Spacial transmission is thus an
inter-societal, integrative process, emphasizing the more
passive or receptive faculties of culture.
This is not to say, however, that there are no resis
tances, strains, and dislocations against the importing of
cultural elements. Since most societies are dynamic, a re
distribution of cultural elements affects the total cul
tural structure within a society and may result in social
upheavals, usually attributed to an accumulation of
internal strains. Often, however, the source of the cul
tural dislocation stems from external influences. Only the
final climax of conversion is internal. Put another way,
spacial transmissions of culture may be subtle and covert,
with the consequences slowly evolving to a point of frus
trating complexity which might underpin revolutionary
change.
On the other hand, there are the obvious manifestations
of cultural diffusion

t

the continuous first-hand, face-to-

face contacts which contribute to acculturation, and which
border, at times, on assimilation. Such cultural confron
tations often provoke an acute self-awareness t
...the group becomes conscious of the fact that it

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

-1 3

constitutes a community of patterns of feelings - or
rather, has a common unconscious psyche - and possesses
its own unity and individuality, its own will to en
dure in existence...(Maritain, p. 5)»
This realization is all the more acute where contacts tend
to be pervasive. Self-awareness is thus reaffirmed or,
perhaps, a newly awakened consciousness of collective per5
sonality gives birth to the idea, "nation" . Henceforth,
the lines of cultural demarcation are drawn; the "we"group and a "they"-group are established. This internaliza
tion of culture induces nationalism.

However, if, in the process of transmission (be it
temporal or spacial), this national culture is subjected
to a chronic imbalance between the two goals of preserva
tion and progress, the nation must look to that authority
6
entrusted with the pursuit of its common good, the state .
5
So as to distinguish between "nation" and "state" two terms which are often (and mistakenly) used interchangably - the following is suggested t by "nation" we mean,
v...a community of people who feel that they belong to
gether in the...sense that they share deeply significant
elements of a common heritage..^"(Emerson, p. 95); "...a
multitude of humans characterized by common and unique cul
tural factors...(sharing) in a common historical past and
...linked by an awareness of its uniqueness..."(Heiman in
Russell, p. 329 ).
While "state" will soon be defined, suffice it to say
now that, whereas "nation" is a subjective term, "state"
is wholly objective (Gatlin, p. 333/* This subjective
quality of "nation" is for Emerson the essence 1
...The simplest statement that can be made about a
nation is that it is a body of people who feel that
they are a nation; and it may be that when all the
fine-spun analysis is concluded this will be the ulti
mate statement as well...(p. 102).
6

In addition to the objective-subjective distinction
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If, on the one hand, diffusion is denied, then there is a
risk of cultural isolation resulting in sterility or stag
nation. On the other hand, if
...the functions of collective life proceed from an
inspiration foreign to the culture or is, in fact,
dominated by foreign elements, the relations of cul
tural exchange between Man and his social environment
are mixed up; the homogeneity of the ethnic environ
ment is weakened and the nation’s renewal organism
and then, sooner or later, its survival are threatened
.♦«(Tremblay Report, vol. 2, p. 21).
In either case, the state intervenes. It alone
possesses both the power and the authority necessary to
confer juridical existence upon the institutions of common
life, to effect the institutionalization of the processes
of culture where those processes, if allowed free play,
might thwart the expressed common will. Indeed, the insti
tutionalization and regulation of the temporal and spacial
transmissions of culture are already evident, particularly
through education and media control.

Contributing to this development in no small way, is
7
technology . Its effects are ubiquitous * neither culture.
previously drawn between the state and nation respectively,
the state is a politico-legal entity and the nation, a
socio-cultural one. The two, however, may be coincident
and, in that case, there exists a nation-state. Moreover,
where the organizing principle or dominant ideology of the
state becomes that of nationality, we have a nationaliststate. But state and nation are often not concordant terms.
The state, the political society, usually encompasses
heterogeneous national elements.
7
Technology is employed here in the same sense that
Grant (Technology and Empire) uses the term; it is Ellul's
"technique" s "...the totality of methods rationally
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nor nation, nor even state go untouched. And as culture,
nation and state are interrelated, so too are the effects
on them which technology brings to bear.
Technology moulds the actions, thoughts and imaginings
of men (Grant, p. 15). It becomes, in an attempt to over
come chance, the unlimited master of men by men; and this
technological mastery of all things has become, in itself,
an end. Furthermore, to the degree that values are not
independent of the will to. technology (as Grant would
argue ), culture is diminished. Its "soul", its "integrating
principle", is itself mastered, mechanically submerged in
the stream of technique.
Ferkiss disagrees with this Ellul-based argument, but
not, however, with its conclusions for culture. Certainly,
cultural order in the technological age is rapidly disinte
grating; but this is largely due to "...the subordination
of technology to the values of earlier historical eras and
its exploitation by those who do not understand its impli
cations and consequences..." (Ferkiss, p. 36 ). For Ferkiss,
arrived at and having
stage of development)
(Ellul, p. xxv).

8

absolute efficiency (for a given
in every field of human activity..."

...As moderns we have no standards by which to judge
particular techniques, except standards welling up
with our faith in technical expansion...(Grant, p. 3^)•
In the pursuit of technological efficiency, any values which
are not part and parcel of, or which do not stem from,
technique, are skepticized into oblivion and illegitimacy
(p. 129 ). This is the reason, according to Grant, why edu
cational content is becoming increasingly "value-free".
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therefore, the central danger facing mankind in the latter
part of the twentieth century lies neither in the autonomy
of technology, nor in the triumph of technological non
values. Rather, it is the danger of an extreme alienation,
an alienation between Man and his milieu *
...what emerges as the pattern of the future is not
technological man so much as neoprimitive man trapped
in a technological environment...(p. 1?3).
Bourgeois man and the world of technique combine for the
fragmentation, disintegration, and general destruction of
9
the cultural order (p. 201) .
However one wishes to approach the process, and what
ever conclusions one might draw therefrom, the impact of
technology on culture is both inevitable and considerable.
It is no less substantial on the collective personality,
the nation. Here, high rates of industrialization, urbaniza
tion, and socio-occupational mobility (all equally stimu
lated by technology), create, in Wheatcroft’s words, "loss
of roots", "psychological homelessness", "existential
insecurity",

"lack of firm consensus on basic values and

norms", "atomization",

"impersonality", and a "disintegra

tion of group continuity" (in Mann, vol. 1, p. 327-329).
The sense of community, the consciousness of collective
9

To whomever one turns, ceteris paribus, the results
are the same t Marcuse already mourns the passing, the de
sublimation of Man's second dimension, his "higher culture";
Ellul speaks of the explosion of local and national cul
tures, for they are unable to coexist with technique (p.
130); and Wheatcroft, like Ferkiss, focuses on the cultural
consequences of "extensive reality negotiation" (in Mann,
vol. 1, p. 338 ) in this technological age.
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personality, the subjective psychology of "we"-ness essential ingredients of the nation concept - are all, in
the extreme, abolished. On this point, Ellul is frank *
...(technical development) dissociates the sociologi
cal forms, destroys the moral framework, desacralizes
men and things, explodes social and religious taboos,
and reduces the body social to a collection of indi
viduals. The most recent sociological studies (even
those made by optimists) hold that technique is the
destroyer of social groups, of communities (whatever
their kind), and of human relations. Technical progress
causes the disappearance...of that 'amalgam of
attitudes, customs and social institutions which con
stitute a community*. Communities break up into their
component parts. But no new communities form. The
individual in contact with technique loses his social
and community sense as the frameworks in which he
operated disintegrate under the influence of tech
niques... (p. 126 ).
Quite different are the effects of technique on the
state. Whereas, under the impact of technology, culture and
nation are subjected to forces of disintegration, the state
is compelled to centralize. In terms both of causation and
of replacement, organizational complexity serves sociologi-

10
cal disunity. Similarly, concentrations of power

supplant

civic efficacy. Possessing the power and legitimacy, the
state is called upon increasingly, by circumstance or
citizenry, to support, to plan and/or to conduct the affairs
10

Franz L. Neumann, in writing (1950) about the relation
ship of technology to power, hypothesized that ;
...the higher the state of technological development,
the greater the concentration of political power...(p.
170 ).
Theobald agrees, but decries not so much the concentration
of power per se, as our lack of contingency plans for this
development :
...our present institutional structures are designed
to increase our power rather than to control our power
...(in Mann, vol. 1, p. 7).
T h i s , for him, is our central dilemma.
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of society. Moreover, in an age of rapid change - which is
the age of technique - that necessitates planning precision
(Grant's "overcoming of chance");

in turn, there evolves,

again by necessity, a decision-making process of unprece
dented intricacy. In the face of technology, therefore, the
state becomes, in short, ever more powerful, ever more
centralized.
Yet technology cuts with a double blade * one is do
mestic, the other, external. It reinforces, on the one
hand, state structures and strength. It facilitates, on the
other hand, primarily through vast networks of communica
tion and intelligence services, penetration

t

...as technology advanced, the opportunities for
penetration increased...
...(state) boundaries have become porous. Techniques
have been fashioned to provide agents of one (state)
with direct access to the population and processes of
a n o t h e r . ( S c o t t , I965, p. 12 and v ) .
From this inevitable permeation of previously isola
ting barriers against effective culture contact, there
arises a threat to the balanced, essential processes of
culture (and therefore of nation). This evokes a reaction
from the state when the state's role as protector is itself
partially diminished. Out of these conditions of a tech
nological age, culture, nation and state merge. From the
perceived assimilation there is an apprehensive feed-back
and from this, in turn, the nationalist-state arises. Inno
vative reinforcement of culture and of nation occurs, for,
paradoxically, where technology renders traditional
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structures and institutions obsolete, only change preserves.

Quebec can be studied from this point of view. Tradi
tional ideologies and institutions which, in the past, had

interpreted and preserved French Canadian culture, have
today been found unsuitable. In the temporal transmission
of culture. Church gave way to state. Now, increasingly,
out of the modern conditions of Quebec's existence in
Canada and in North America, even a state-reinforced
temporal transmission is, for survival purposes,
cient. Extra-cultural,

insuffi

extra-national, support is required.

That Quebec has indeed undergone this development from cultural preservation through isolation, to a deter
mined state involvement in the temporal and spacial trans
missions of culture - and, that such a development has
posed certain problems for the state of Quebec, as for the
Canadian state, are the subject-matters dealt with below.
Culture, Nation and State i
The Quebec Experience
...The Quebecker is no longer a metropolitan Frenchman,
but neither has he become a North American - Yankee or
Canadian. Over the centuries he has forged a different
collective personality...(Rioux, p. 9)»
Through the forceful interplay of historical and
environmental factors there has emerged, in the Province of
Quebec, a unique culture, or, at least, a subjective cul
tural distinction the issue of which has become the Québé
cois nation. Since the Conquest, policies to ensure the
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survival of .that nation have been propounded, and the
politics of Quebec has been, historically, the politics of
survival.

11
The Conquest as a starting point is quite significant
for.
...the French Canadian clergy found itself, in 1763 ,
the only representative of the national conscience and
the national culture, the only elite...(Rioux, p. 35).
Having thus a near monopoly over the definition of the pur
poses and policies for cultural-national preservation,

it

was natural that the Church should proceed with such formu12
lations within its own frame of reference
. Yet not until
11

...nearly every French Canadian, viewing the place of
his community in Canada, almost invariably begins with
an interpretation of the meaning of the British
Conquest...(Cook, 1971, p. 100).
For a general overview of the purpose and force of the inter
pretations, see "Conqu&tisme", p. 99-113 in Cook, 1971.

12
That frame of reference is well described by the
Tremblay Report, vol. 2, p. 35-39* It embodies three basic
concepts s ( T ) t h e sense of order (which is "the very
essence of...the social doctrine of the Catholic Church");
(2 ) the sense of liberty ("... it means living according to
the requirements of order as established by the natural
lav;, which is itself illuminated by Revelation..."); and
(3 ) the sense of progress (ie. 'real* progress t "...an
improvement of the man himself by a constant raising of his
intellectual and moral level..."). This religious concept
of life is reflected, organizationally, in the society of
Quebec which they favoured % (a) it was personalist (that
is to say, it espoused systems of work and property which
ensured maximum autonomy - agriculture and crafts, or more
recently, small businesses, co-operatives. Catholic trade
unions, etc.); (b) it was communal (ie. there existed an
organic unity amongst family, profession and parish - the
latter being, "the mother institution of public institu
tions", "the veritable centre of social life"). See also
Falardeau in Rioux and Martin, p. 3^2-357» in addition.
Cook's anthology (I969 ) contains the best known formulations
which were derived from this frame of reference.
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after the 1837-38 Rebellion and after the assimilative im
plications of Lord Durham's Report, did these nationalistic
formulations have their fullest impact. Bonenfant and
Falardeau point this out t
...Group consciousness and patriotic feeling...developed
...after the British Conquest, as a result of isolation,
contrast and struggle with the culturally-alien
conquering group...
.
but,
...Quebec nationalism as a political expression...ac
tually came to life against the assimilation attempt
of the Union Act...(in Cook, I969, p. 19-20 and 22).
For the greater part of the next century, then, the
political and socio-economic thinking of Québécois - with a
view to survival - was strongly coloured by the traditional
teachings and influence (the social doctrine) of the French
13
Canadian Catholic Church
. It began with G a m e au and con
tinued with Groulxî

it was characterized by the promotion

of the three myths, I'agriculturalisme, 1'anti-etatisme and
le messianisme (Brunet, p. 113-166); it was a nationalism
wholly "defensive", "apostolic and formalistic".

13

The Church certainly dominated the ideology of survi
val, but that ideology was by no means monolithic. Others Lafontaine, Cartier, Tache - advocated survival through
political participation (double majority theory); Papineau,
an anti-cleric, desired annexation to the United States;
Laurier, Bourassa and Laurendeau - each to varying degrees sought cultural preservation in a pan-Canadian, rather than
an English-dominated or British-oriented, state. However,
even those who subscribed to the larger pan-Canadian nation
alism advocated the absolute maintenance of a French Cana
dian culture and retreated to (more or less) defensive po
sitions in moments of crisis. Indeed, in such moments of
crisis - economic, political or military - that defensive
nationalism was rooted more strongly in definitions of race,
religion, language and history.
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"traditionalist",
Cook,

"conservative and bourgeois" (Leger in

1969, p. 306); it wove into a close and mutually in

terdependent association, cultural and religious values;
but most importantly, on the political plane, that tradi14
tional nationalism was reactionary
. When the state was
used as an instrument for cultural-national survival (most
notably under Mercier and Duplessis), it was cast in a
somewhat negative role - as a protector, a barrier against
external threats, and thus, in withdrawal, fostering
further isolation.

All this is in contrast to contemporary purposes and
policies. Certainly, some traditional strains remain and
form the foundations for the present. However, the nation
alist spectrum has widened considerably, and the mainstream
has at its source, indigenous, secular and progressive ele
ments, At the heart of this development is the growing
acceptance of, and emphasis upon, the positive role of the
state.
Cut off from their cultural fountainheads, France and
Rome, during World War II, an increasing number of French
14

The most outspoken and politically active Churchmen
have been, until recently, ultramontane. (The basic prin
ciples of French Canadian nationalistic ultramontanism, as
laid down by Mgr. Laflèche, are found in Wade, I968 , vol. 1,
p. 346.) With a deep suspicion of democracy and of the state,
and strongly authoritarian in political matters, the Church
was the object of much criticism particularly after WW I I .
See especially * Trudeau, I 968 , "Some Obstacles to Democracy
in Quebec"; Trudeau, 1970; and, in Cook, I969, "Quebec on
the Eve of the Asbestos Strike"; see also Corbett, p. 127-

132

.
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Canadians attended English Canadian and American universities,
and received there applied, pure, and social science

training (Wade in Park, p. 375)* Thus, the post-war intel
lectual elite of Quebec was, ulike previous generations of
classically-educated leaders, both more aware and more op
timistic regarding the potentials of democracy and of the
state. With the doctrine of popular sovereignty, the state
would advance and direct, rather than isolate and protect,
the socio-economic and cultural developments of Québécois.
The School of Social Sciences at Laval, 1 ‘Institut Canadien
des Affaires publiques, and Cité Libre were symbols of this
new thought.
Yet, while this "quiet revolution" of political,
nomic and sociological thought was not, originally,

eco

‘other-

directed* , the consequences which it occasioned, were. From
this there arose Quebec's neo-nationalism.

Guindon traces the development of this modern nation
alism to the breakdown in the 1950's of "mutually satisfying
institutional self-segregation" (in Kruhlak, p. 88-93)• The
post-war bureaucratization of Quebec had created a large,
white-collared middle class which, because it had been edu
cated in modern technology, business and industry, rejected
the old nationalist tenets and myths, as embodied by the
policies of Duplessis $ "to resist assimilation from with
out, to resist emancipation from within" (Cook, I966, p. 99)*
These were incompatible with the modernization ethic; they
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hampered rationalization; they ignored the singularly impor
tant criterion of objective competence. Thus the efforts of
this new middle class were directed towards reform at home,
towards the modernization and rationalization of Quebec's
society and institutions, towards the removal of those ele
ments which impeded their own progress, towards the defeat,
therefore, of Duplessis. It was not anti-English or antiAmerican. It was not conservative t
...Modernization, bureaucratic rationality, and per
sonal qualification became the tools for the new middle
class to assess the worth of not only the institutions
but also the ideologies of the past. Ethnically homo
genous, the new middle class was not initially ethnic
ally conscious...
...The values of the middle class were those of modern
liberalism with emphasis on progress and social change
articulated partly in class interests but not in terms
of ethnic conflict...(Guindon in Kruhlak, p. 84-86),
The progress of this class was defined by occupational
mobility. However, since the Quebec bureaucracy was more or
less specialized and of a smaller scale and size (these
were due to Duplessis* autonomist policies which duplicated
the federal bureaucracy but, of course, on a much smaller
scale), middle class growth was restricted by the channels
of mobility on the one hand, and by the levels of mobility
on the other. These were structural constraints of an occu
pational and geographical nature. While the former could be
and was partially overcome by a bureaucratic transformation
of the traditional institutions, the latter constraint in
volved ethnic contact, and the breakdown of self-segregated
institutions. The ethnic competition thus engendered gave
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rise to a new nationalism.
This neo-nationalism was completely compatible with the
new middle class ethic. Indeed, its driving force was
modernization and development

t

the modernization and de

velopment of the state of Quebec - for it and it alone was
perceived as capable of providing for French-speaking Québé
cois, not only opportunities on a non-disciminatory basis,
but also, at last, the "possession of their rightful heri
tage" *
...The advent of liberal democracy to the province bore
promise of power for all classes henceforth. But in
practice the newly self-conscious classes have found
most roads to a better life blocked » the clergy clings
to its grip on education, the English continue to domi
nate our finances, and the Americans intrude upon our
culture. Only Quebec as a state would appear to belong
unquestionably to French Canadians; and the fullest
power for that state is therefore highly desirable...
(Trudeau, 1968 , p. 173).
That Quebec began to see itself as a twentieth-century
industrial society, and that it began to look to the future
(rather than past) for its Golden Age, were, for Rioux,

"the

two most significant changes of the early I 960 's" (p. 78 ).
A new reckoning - with itself, with Canada, and with the
world - was taking shape. The Liberals, to be sure, ex
pressed both in form and in substance the prevalent desire
of Québécois to be "maîtres chez nous". This first had the
stamp of equality 1 an equality of opportunity, an equality
of economic, political, and socio-cultural conditions. Even
"associate state" and "special status" advocates, because
their proposals all pivot on the two-nation thesis, desire,
implicitly - if not explicitly - equality

t
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...they (all such proponents) exhibit one predominant
motive:
they want their community to have in the
structure of Canada an accepted equality with the E n 
glish speaking people...(Brady in Fox, p. 29).
To this end, the lesage government undertook a series
of confrontations, - in Canada (demands for a larger share
of the direct tax field, for the elimination of joint-cost
programmes, for the end, in short, of 'creeping central!zation', the greatest impediment to effective economic plan
ning), and in Quebec (the establishment of hospital and
welfare services, of regional and general economic corpora
tions, the restructuring of the provincial civil service,
the public ownership of hydro power, and "the institutiona
lization of the temporal transmission of culture" - i.e.
15
the creation of a public school system)
. The passage of
government in 1966 from the Liberals to the Union Nationals
did not, fundamentally, alter this trend.

The "State of

Quebec" in its positive role had come to stay.
Furthermore, the die of that positive state had been
cast;

15

there was no possible retreat from the realization

It is of interest to point out one separatist's view
of these confrontations.
In so far as the reform measures
were equality-directed, and in so far as they expressed the
"ideology of catching up", they were "essentially a negation
of Quebec as a nation":
...Only the ideology of catching up is by definition
federalist, for it envisages the pure and simple
integration of the Quebec people in a greater
American world, through the intermediary of Canada...
(Rioux, p. 79)'
For the separatists, the assertion of the state ought
to proceed hand in hand with an assertion of the nation,
until finally, these two attain a coincident maturity as
manifested in an independent and sovereign nation-state.
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(born prior to, but given full expression in, the "quiet
revolution") that cultural-national survival and economic
development ^ere two sides of the same coin, that they were
inextricably bound up, one with the other.
fact today.

It is a vital

It is recognized by capitalists and socialists,

by federalists and separatists alike:
...sans prospérité économique, nous ne pourrons jamais
atteindre les objectifs culturels et sociaux que nous
rechercherons tous...(Bourassa / QuébecI, p. 11).
...to return to the example of the language, it is
obvious that its salvation, that is, its existence as
the deep-rooted expression of the milieux, will remain
an impossibility until there are powerful economic and
social motives for speaking French, until French is the
language of labour and activity in all spheres, the
language of economic success and social progress...
(Leger in Cook, 1969 , p. 3IO).
Therefore, through the exercise of autonomy (i.e. what
ever autonomy it may possess and may, in its confrontations,
gain), the Quebec government is able to institute economic
programmes which accord with the provincial cultural milieu.
Projects wherein French is the language of both employer and
emoloyee, programmes which, in structure and in organization,
16
are inspired by the French genius
, are most likely to safe
guard and reinforce cultural-national values.
least towards assimilation.

They tend

At the same time, working within

his own cultural milieu, the French Canadian employee is more

16

For a discussion of the general, national genius and
of the specific, French genius, see Tremblay Report, vol.
2 , p. 16-17 and p. 33 respectively.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PR

«

economically efficient and, consequently, more likely to
succeed and to advance.

Otherwise - the working environment

not being culturally hospitable - a sense of diminishment,
irritation and dissatisfaction, and loss of efficiency
result (Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism;
Report, vol. 1, p. xxlx - x x x ) .
Economic development promotes cultural progress;

and,

a culturally harmonious workplace produces, in turn, a more
economically competent workforce.
The question of 'how to survive• is thus answered in
contemporary Quebec terms.

Cultural and economic development

programmes, attuned to the indigenous environment, are mu 
tually reinforcing.
"Why to survive' is something else again.

As it is no
17

longer a question answerable by Mgrs. Lafleche and Paquet
neither is it a case of survival-for-survival's-sake.
the policies there lies a purpose.

Behind

It is a new purpose, a

re-orientation which arose simultaneously with the thought

18
and policies of the "quiet revolution"

*

17

These were two noteworthy exponents of the traditional
"providential mission" of French Canadians.
Sec Lafleche's
"The Providential Mission of the French Canadians", p. 92106, and Paquet's "A Sermon on the Vocation of the French
Race in America", p. 52-l60# both in Cook, 1969*

18

Part and parcel of the re-interpretation of the state's
role, was a re-thinking of the form and content of 'la sur
vivance'.
Paul Gerin-Lajoie expressed it well:
...We have survived enough...The time has come to
give this survival a positive sense, to fix a goal
for it, and to justify it...(Cook, 1966, p. 23).
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...Leaving behind them the 1950's, when a vengeful
self-criticism was the order of the day,
Quebeckers
recovered their self-confidence and began to ask
themselves what else they could accomplish as a
community.
For a century they had striven to pre
serve their heritage;; more recently, they had tried
to catch up with the other North Americans; now
they ask themselves if they did not have some ori
ginal contribution to make to the world of human
societies.
They were reasserting their vocation
as a nation...(Rioux, p. ? 6 ).
That Québécois seek to preserve their linguistic and
cultural particularisms in the face of an assimilative technological era, is no reaction, no defensive preservation of
the status q u o .
tion.

It is a direct result of the end of isola

It is the first step in "l'épanouissement des Qué

bécois" (Sabourin in Le Devoir, p. I 69 ).

It is, above all

else, a proud extroversion which stems from their uniqueness
as an economically-developed French speaking society:

for,

with France, they stand on the brink of post-technological
development; yet, unlike France, their culture is distinctly
northern.

In both capacities, Quebec serves as an example

to the predominantly underdeveloped Francophonie, and per-

'

ceives its contribution to the human race in these terms.
To falter economically, or to succumb culturally,
their raison d'etre.

Thus,

is to lose

1

enters once more " 'Etat du

Québec".

Cultural-national preservation and progress is the
primary means to the longer-term goal.

For this reason,

greater fiscal autonomy is pursued; education (the temporal
transmission of culture) is structured and supported (insti
tutionalized) by the state; spacial transmission is all that

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

30

remains.
If Quebec as a cultural nation is to survive,
dultural reinforcement is essential.

external

Quebec sits as a

French-speaking island of six million in an English-speaking
sea forty times its size.

Its economy is anglo-oriented and,

in its daily life, it is subjected to a culturally-alien
bombardment:
...Quebeckers have witnessed the disintegration of the
way of life which traditionally protected them...
Almost overnight they found themselves in an indus
trial society requiring massive intervention by the
state, open to the whole of North America, and ex
posed to the influence of foreign, especially
American, culture backed by such powerful means of
communication as speedy transport, highways, cinema,
radio, and television...(Preliminary Statement:
Confederation of Tomorrow Conference, p.
Beyond this sea, however, the French language and
genius thrives (Morrison, p. 11-15).

While by no means a

replica of Québécois culture, it is nevertheless a nonassimilative source of strength and reinforcement.

Moreover,

in cultural terms, diffusion - short of assimilation - is
both normal and healthy.
To this, then, the Québécois turn, their principal
instrument of communication being the state.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CHAPTER II
THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OP QUEBEC
The history of Quebec's relations with sovereign
states is, for the most part, not unique. Indeed, until the

1960 's, its development was very much in step with that of
other Canadian provinces. The quickening pace of activities
abroad during the 1960 's was merely a cultural, political
and economic manifestation of the previously-mentioned
reorientations from within.

Canadian provinces have always demonstrated a concern
over their particular interests abroad, and, in so far as
they were empowered by the constitution, a desire to oro1
tect them personally . This was evident from the moment
Canada opened its first oversea offices. Provincial legis
lative rights in matters of immigration, agriculture and
commerce seemed to provide justification, if not authority,
for the establishment of their own provincial agencies in
1
The following historical account is based upon Andre
Patry's 1964 submission to the Comité Parlementaire de la
Constitution (established in I 963 by the Assemblée légis
lative du Québec). Revised in I 965 , the account appears in
book form with other submissions which deal with Les Pou
voirs Extérieurs du Québec (Brossard et al.). This work
also formed the basis for Daniel Johnson's speech in favour
of Bill 33 , a bill to establish the Department^of Inter
governmental Affairs. (See Debats de l'Assemblée Législa
tive, 13 avril 1967 , p. 2167 - 21^111

—
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Great Britain and elsewhere. On October 31, 1868, delega
tions of the governments of Canada, New Brunswick, Ontario
and Quebec met in conference. They agreed there that :
...Outre les agences européenes du Canada, chaque province pourra nommer tels agents en Europe ou ailleurs
qu'elle jugera a propos de choisir et ces agents
seront dûment accrédités par le gouvernement général
...(Brossard, p. 67 ).
It was by virtue of this agreement that Canadian provinces
were to open offices in Great Britain, and later, in other
countries of Europe and of America.
In London, however, the simultaneous presence of both
federal and provincial representatives proved administra
tively and financially burdensome. It was therefore decided
in 1874 to group the provincial offices and to place them
all in the same building, under the authority of the
Canadian Agent-General. But, when in 1880 the federal govern
ment named a High-Commissioner (Alexander Galt) to London,
the provinces soon re-established their own representation
in the British capital.
These provincial delegations were not formally recognized by the Imperial Government. Unlike the Australian
state representatives, the Canadian counterparts received
no official status because they came from British terri-

tories wherein the (lieutenant-) governors were not named
by an imperial act (Keith, vol.

2,

p. 6 5 1 ) . This absence of

status, which forced the provincial agents to communicate
with the Colonial Office via the Canadian High-Commissibner,
was the source of much friction between the federal
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- 33 government (who fully supported the British attitude) and
certain provincial governments (Keith, vol. 1, p. 343).
Following the first world war, the Canadian HighCommissioner in Great Britain attempted to boost the prestige of provincial representatives by conferring upon them

2
certain official functions . Nevertheless, on the eve of
WW II, when all but British Columbia withdrew their London
agents, no provincial delegation had yet been recognized

3
by the British government »

Quebec's agents in Great Britain and in France date
from the nineteenth century. While the post at London was
abolished shortly after its creation and placed under the
Agent-General of Canada, the Paris office functioned from
1882 to 1911 . During this period. Hector Fabre represented
both the Dominion and the Quebec governments. He held at
once the positions of Commissariat général du Canada, and
Agent commercial et financier du Québec. His successor,
Phillippe Roy, ceased to perform this dual role and became,
2

The Canadian Annual Review (I923 ) speaks of this
attempt :
...adopting the Australian practice, Hon. Mr. Larkin
(Canadian High-Commissioner) announced his intention
of associating the Agents-General of the Provinces with
him in the discharge of some of his duties...The
Agents-General welcomed the innovation, hoping that it
might prove a stepping stone to the restoration of
their constitutional right to direct access to the
Crown in relation to Provincial affairs which the Do
minion had refused to acknowledge since Lord Strathcona's time.,.(p. 109).

3
In 1943 , Ontario re-established its London Agent-Gene
ral; other provinces soon followed suit.
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simply, the'Commissioner-Genoral of Canada.
A law adopted in I909 and promulgated in I9 II autho
rized the government of Quebec to name an Agent-General to
Britain and another to Belgium. Such a delegate was proposed
- in 1911 for London, and in the course of world war one*
for Brussels. Each agent was thereby placed under the pro4
vincial premier's authority . In 193& this law was repealed
to be replaced by a

1940 statute

giving the Department of

Municipal Affairs, Commerce and Industry authority over
the nomination and control of Agents-General. Abrogated in
turn, this legislation was superceded by a new law in I96 I
"qui parle aussi bien de délégués généraux que d'agents
généraux et qui place ces fonctionnaires sous l'autorité
du ministre de l'Industrie et du Commerce" (Brossard, p.

5

68) .
The official status of Quebec's Delégations-Générales
(there are presently three : London, New York and Paris)
has changed very little over time. In the United Kingdom,
provincial agents may enjoy the same privileges and immu
nities as foreign consuls; in the United States, provincial
4^
The Revised Statutes of the Province of Quebec (1909,
vol. 1) reads :
...He (the Agent-General) shall be under the control
of the First Minister, and shall follow the instructions which may be given him, from time to time, by
the latter...(p.
? ).

22

5

See * Loi relative a l'Agent-général de la province
dans le royaume de Belgique^ Statut du Québec, 1936, ch. 18;
Loi concernant les agents généraux de la province. Statut
du Québec, 1940, ch. 10; Loi concernant les agents ou dêlégues généraux de la province. Statut du Québec, I96 O-6 I,
ch. 85 .
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delegates have been accorded (by the State Department)
those certain diplomatic privileges which non-official mem6
bers of Canadian consulates also enjoy ; and in France, by
virtue of an agreement between Canada and France, the
Quebec Delégation-Genérale partakes of similar immunities

and privileges.
Nevertheless, provincial agents abroad can not be
officially accredited to the governments of sovereign states,
nor can they officially negotiate with them. In principle,
they enjoy no privilege and no immunity. Even in practice,
it is only by courtesy that, in London, New York and Paris,
they are accorded privileges of a diplomatic character.
This is not to be confused with a true consular or diplo
matic status; nor are such courtesies granted elsewhere;
nor do they extend to other staff members, beyond the Délé
gué Général. In short, Quebec, like all Canadian provinces,
possesses no jus lo^ationis.
This absence of jus legationis stems from the fact
7
that "the provinces have no status in international law" .
6

7

...Ces avantages...consistent principalement dans l'ex
emption du service militaire, de l'imp6t^sur le revenu
et das droits de douane lors du premier établissement
...(Brossard, p. 6 9 ).
In Paris and in London, the privileges and immunities con
sist of the following i
...l'inviolabilité des locaux et l'immuntté de juridic
tion quant aux actes accomplis par le délégué général
dans l'exercice de ses fonctions, ainsi que l'exemption
d'imp6t sur le revenu et de droits de douane sur les
importations pour fins officielles ou strictement per
sonnelles..«(Brossard, p. 237 )'
Re The Weekly Rest in Industrial Undertaking Act, The
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Despite :their lengthy involvement on the international
plane, the provinces have acquired no legal external rights,
nor have they particularly aspired to such (Debats, 13
avril 1967, p. 2176), The federal government for over forty
years has exercised an exclusive competence in this field
and, until recently, has done so unchallenged.

Quebec now challenges that position. The reorientation
of politics at home, and the re-definition of the means and
ends of cultural-national survival, gave birth to and
nourished that challenge - a challenge which, having begun

with Lesage and continued by Johnson and Bertrand, knows no
party lines; a challenge which, throughout the 1960 's, has
been executed by thought, by word, and especially by deed.

...les premisses de notre action dans le domaine in
ternational remontent...à ma première entrevue avec
le président de Gaulle, a l'automne '6 I, lors de
l'ouverture de la Maison du Québec à Paris...(Jean
Lesage; Débats, 13 avril 1967 , p. 2172-2173).
As with previous openings of Agences-Genérales, there
had been created no constitutional commotion when, in 1940,
the New York office was established. Similarly, the subsequent October I96 I opening of the Délégation-Générale du

Quebec à Paris did not per se create a problem. (Ontario,
as one province, operated several European agencies at that
Minimum Wages Act and The Limitation of Hours of Work A c t ,
1936"S.C.R. 45l, p. 510 * Ihe intention here is not to enter
upon the legal argument at this stage. That will follow.
The author wishes merely to relate the long-established
thought regarding provincial rights on the international
plane, and thus to convey the unconventional nature of
Quebec's activities in the 1960's.
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time.) Even-the enthusiastic welcome given by France to
Lesage provoked no suspicion in Ottawa or elsewhere that de
Gaulle was recognizing Quebec as an international persona
lity. Nonetheless, a somewhat low-key debate was aroused
when Quebec wished to obtain for its representatives those
rights and privileges ordinarily given to consular officers.
(The question was, as we have seen, resolved to Quebec's
advantage.) Quebec, for its part, issued a ministerial
decree granting all foreign consular officers within Quebec

several fiscal privileges, "tels que l'exemption de l'impôt
sur le revenu et des droits sur les successions" (Brossard,
p. 239 ).
Again, in 19&2, Lesage officiated at the opening of
the new Délégation-Générale in London, naming Lapointe (the
present Lieutenant-Governor) its representative.
Such activities abroad by the government of Quebec
were neither novel nor startling; they elicited little
federal concern. No pattern of exceptional behaviour was
(or perhaps could have been) deduced from what appeared to
be, superficially at least, matters of a routine nature.
However, the next few years of continued and accelerated
involvement by Quebec with foreign states and international

bodies were to shed new light upon these first few acts.
Today, by virtue of hindsight, they are interpreted as
Quebec's initial forays into the external world. They mark
the serious quest for an international competence, a quest
which, throughout that decade, never ceased to arouse grave
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constitutional concerns.
Early in

1964,

/

a Direction des delegations k l'étranger

was established within the Department of Industry and
Commerce. This section was to co-ordinate the activities of
all Quebec delegations abroad, and, because within those
delegations several departments were represented, it was to
regulate administrative problems as well. More important
perhaps than this administrative housekeeping of external
involvement was the Quebec-ASTEF

agreement in February of

that same year. This instituted a programme of FrancoQuébécois exchanges of young civil servants and technicians.
Yet, while Quebec was to administer that programme, it was
the federal Department of External Affairs which approved
and concluded the final arrangements with the Quai d'Oreay,
and which, in so doing, altered the original content :
instead of Quebec choosing by itself all ten exchange
trainees, the Department of External Affairs authorized the
federal government to nominate two. One can only speculate
about the impact of the 1964 alteration. It may well have
been an experience influential upon the following year's
conduct.
From 1965 to the end of the decade^ Quebec moved
decidedly into the international arena. In Paris, on February 27 , 1965 , the French and Quebec Ministers of Education
8

ASTEF (l'Association pour l'organisation des stages
en Franco) is a non-profit, subsidiary agency of the French
government. The agreement was arranged and administered by
the Quebec Department of Youth (now Department of Education)
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and the French Director-General of Cultural and Technical
Affairs negotiated and signed an entente whereby programmes
of exchanges (teachers, students and researchers) and oooperation in the field of education would proceed. The
agreement also established a Commission permanente de co
opération franco-québécois, charged with the administration
and operation of such programmes. It would meet regularly
9
and alternately in Paris and in Quebec . This was followed
soon after by the establishment of a Service de co-operation avec l'extérieur, within Quebec's Education Department.
By being a party to the education entente, Quebec
seemed to pose a serious precedent in terms of provincial
relations with another sovereign state. The federal govern
ment did not modify the terms of that agreement because,
according to Ottawa, the entente's significance had alrea
been minimized on the date of signing by: a pre-arranged
exchange of letters between the French Ambassador and the
Secretary of State for External Affairs. The exchanged
letters merely requested and granted the Canadian govern
ment's consent in the proposed educational programme
(Federalism and International Relations, p. 2?),
on the one hand, and by the Ecole nationale d'administra
tion de France, on the other. In matters of external rela
tions, the French school falls within the jurisdiction of
the Quai d'Orsay.

9
Such meetings began immediately : Quebec (May, 1965^*
Paris (November, 1965), Quebec (June, I966 ), Paris (April,
1967 ), As of January 1, 1971, ten conferences have been
held, the last being in Paris, November-December, 1970.
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Quebec, in contrast to the federal view, presented a
different interpretation of these events. Attaching great
symbolic importance to this entente,

it portrayed Ottawa

in a defensive, reactionary role :
...lorsque le Québec a signé la première entente
France-Québec a Paris le 2? février I965 , c'était la
première fois qu'un gouvernement d'une, province du
Canada prenait une semblable, initiative en négociant
lui-même et en signant, dans les formes d'usage, une
entente internationale de même qu'en participant a une
commission permanente de co-operation pour en assurer
la mise en oeuvre. Cet événement a provoqué à l'épo
que de multiples réactions et a incité le gouvernement
fédéral k déclarer que le Canada n'avait qu'une seule
personalité internationale et qu'à ce titre, seul
l'exécutif fédéral avait le pouvoir de conclure des
traités. Et, marquant bien sa détermination, le mini
stre des Affaires extérieures du Canada procédait à
une échange de lettres avec l'ambassade de France à
Ottawa le jour même de la signature de l'entente
France-Québec pour déclarer que l'entente "recontre
l'assentiment du gouvernement canadien"...(Paul Gerinlajoie; Débats, I3 avril 19&7, p. 21?4).
It matters little, for the purposes of this work,
which side of the federal-provincial argument is correct.
It is natural - and must be assumed in the absence of ex
tensive interviews - that Quebec would proceed to further
action on the basis of its own perceptions of the actors'
roles, and of the significance of the entente, and not upon
those perceptions of Ottawa. Indeed,

its attitudes and

deeds shortly thereafter seem to confirm this.
The following month,

in April I965, Minister of Edu-

cation Gerin-Lajoie spoke to the consular corps of Montreal,
His speech of government policy outlined yet another area
wherein Quebec wished to assert its international compe
tence and personality *

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

...Sans doute exercez-vous ici vos fonctions en vertu
d'une autorisation du gouvernement fédéral * mais vous
êtes, a certains égards, plus près des autorités qué
bécoises que de celles qui vous ont habilités b agir
en qualité'officielle. Én effet, d'une part,^ la juri
diction de la plupart d'entre vous se borne à des
circonscriptions entièrement comprises dans les
limites territoriales du Québec; d'autre part, cette
même juridiction intéresse, dans une large mesure,
des domaines relevant strictement de la compétence de
notre Etat fédéré. D'après la dernière convention de
Vienne (art^ 5, para, b), les fonctions consulaires
consistent à favoriser le développement de relations
commerciales, économiques, culturelles et scienti
fiques entre l'Etat d'envoi et l'Etat de résidence.

tiqn^ 12 avril 1965» Service d'information du Minis
ters; p. 1-3).
One may note here that this position did not change under
the Union Nationale. On May 7, I967 » Daniel Johnson affirmed
that the granting of privileges to consulates within Quebec
fell within his government's jurisdiction, and that, fur
thermore, his government was fully prepared to take the
Initiative in this matter (le Devoir, 8 mai I 967 , P* 1).
But Quebec pressed forward in 1965* In order to co
ordinate the various departmental relations with foreign
governments and organizations, the government announced in

August that the Deputy Minister of Federal-Provincial
Affairs would chair a new Commission interministérielle des
relations extérieures. This committee was composed of
deputy ministers of departments "likely to have close know
ledge of relations with foreign countries and groups"
(Sabourin in Clarkson, p. 104); thus, the Departments of
Federal-Provincial Affairs, Education, Cultural Affairs,
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Industry and'Commerce,

and Health were all involved. For

many observers, this move appeared as a first step towards
the creation of a Department of External Affairs, even
though Mr, Lesage, in an attempt to allay these fears, said

that the committee would stick to matters of provincial
jurisdiction (Sabourin in Clarkson, p. 104).
The October 19&5 opening of a Bureau économique in
Milan was rather uneventful, particularly when compared to
events of the following month. On November 17, Canada and
Prance concluded a cultural agreement ;
...This agreement established a general framework
(accord cadre) designed to facilitate arrangements be
tween provincial governments and the French Government,
and provided that such arrangements could be entered
into by the provinces either by reference to the accord
cadre and exchange of notes or by specific authorizan the part of the Federal Government through a
further exchange of letters...(Federalism and Inteo
national Relations, p. 28).
The next week, the French Ambassador and the Quebec
Minister of Cultural Affairs signed a cultural entente for
10
co-operation in cultural and artistic fields
. The entente,
however, made no reference either to the accord cadre or to
an exchange of letters. Instead, the French Ambassador
merely informed the federal government of this agreement
and requested Ottawa's assent. This was granted by Mr.

Martin in an exchange of letters that very day, November 24.
The terms of the "umbrella agreement" were thereby met.
10

Similar to that procedure employed in February, following the educational entente, a Service de co-operation avec
l'extérieur was established soon after within the Depart
ment of Cultural Affairs.
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Controversy was, nevertheless, generated by this en
tente. Some regarded the exchange of letters as quite
"hasty" (Atkey in Confederation Challenge, vol. 2, p. 162;
and Brossard, p. 195)* indicating that the Department of
External Affairs was less than prepared for Quebec's

actions. Others continued the February argument, contending
that Quebec had reaffirmed the significance of that month's
11

precedent-setting education entente

. It was not until

July 7, 1970 that Pierre laporte (the 19&5 Minister of
Cultural Affairs) made clear the thinking which lay behind
the lesage government's conduct ;
...J'ai signe la premiere entente culturelle avec
Paris, l'on m'a fréquemment demande : 'Est-ce que
Ottawa a etë consulté?' J'aurais fait la manchette de
tous les journaux, le lendemain, si j'avais dit ;
Jamais! Nous avons l'intention...et blablabla...J'ai
répondu aux journalistes : J'ai le choix entre deux
choses : commencer ici au Canada une querelle sensationelle ou signer une entente culturelle avec Par.1 s .
Qu'est-ce que le plus valable pour le Québec? Alors,
la veille, l'avant-veille, ou deux semaines avant, le
gouvernement du Canada a signe des ententes culturelles
avec Paris. Quel mal cela nous a-t-il fait? J'ai signé
avec Paris une entente qui^a fait la joie de tout le
monde et qui, cette fois-là, n'a pas été signé à
l'occasion d'une querelle. Nous avons eu depuis, sous
le gouvernement qui nous a précédé et sous celui dont
j'ai fait partie avant, les fruits de cette entente...
(Débats, 7 juillet 1970, p. 79%).
Despite conflicting interpretations of roles and actual
events,

19&5 was certainly a watershed. Quebec, both as a

province and as a cultural-national community, had
11

...In the House of Commons...Opposition members charged
that Quebec had started the negotiations without in
forming the Federal Department of External Affairs,
and that Canadian assent had been given only after the
agreement had already been signed...(Morrison, p. 20).
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accomplished much on the international scene. Precedents
had been set, seeds of controversy planted. Equally importsmt was the creation.of administrative machinery, a

reflection of Quebec's resolve and permanence of action in
international affairs. Funds had bean allocated and m a n 
power employed for a vast range of cultural, technical and
educational programmes, and these projects, all initially
with France, were designed to enrich and thus to strengthen
the culture of Quebec. It was the manifestation of a much
needed, much desired, cultural diffusion.
In terms of Quebec's international relations, little
occurred the following year. The June I966 provincial elec
tions had transferred power unexpectedly from the Parti
liberal to the Union Nationale. Quebec's lack of initiative
in external affairs was therefore due not so much to a
period of cooling-off, as to the pre-occupations with in
ternal governmental consolidation. Indeed, in retrospect,
this lull was much more the calm before a storm, for early ,

1967 witnessed the first of several moves to entrench those
rights which, in the eyes of the new Quebec government, had
already been gained.
In January 1967* jurisdiction over the DelegationsGenérales and over other foreign offices of Quebec was
transferred from the Department of Industry and Commerce,
to the Office of the Premier. Not only did this provide an
indication that the government was undergoing a re-organisa
tion of administration, but it furnished an index of
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priority as well ; the international relations of Quebec
were to assume a prominent position in the politics of
Daniel Johnson. The March budget confirmed this latter
point. Education and cultural affairs formed two of the
three priorities of the Johnson government, and cultural
affairs alone received a substantial increase in funds of
thirty-eight percent. Furthermore, within this area, the
most favoured item was "la diffusion de la culture". Monies
directed towards international relations were enlarged by
twenty percent, to a total of three million dollars.
Divided amongst four major ministries, this last sum was

allotted for two purposes only * (a) different co-operative
efforts, but particularly to the application of FrancoQuebec educational and cultural accords; and (b) délégations-générales and agences du Québec abroad (le Devoir,
18 mars 1967* p. 4),

In April I967 , the salience of Quebec's international
role was reaffirmed. Regarded by Sabourin as "the most
important initiative that Quebec has taken" (in Clarkson,
p. 105), the National Assembly debated and adopted Bill 33»
This bill established the Department of Intergovernmental
Affairs, a central co-ordinating authority under whose
jurisdiction would fall the Delégations-Genérales, the
Agences du Quebec, and all of the province's "external"
activities. According to Johnson, several factors contri
buted towards the necessity of that bill; of these, four
were quite dominant :
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...Premièrement, le désir du Québec d'occuper]ieine^
ment tous les domaines de sa compétence et, a cette
fin, de se donner les moyens d'action les plus efficaces possibles, tant sur le plan de l'élaboration'
des politiques que sur celui de la co-ordination de
ses positions.
...Deuxièmement, l'objectif de hater la solution du
problème constitutionnel canadien et en même temps
d'élargir les horizons du Québec dans les domaines
de sa compétence,
^
^
...Troisièmement, la nécessite de mettre un terme a
la dispersion actuelle, dispersion entre divers mini
stères, des responsabilités administratives, notam
ment en ce qui concerne l'action extra-territoriale
du Québec, particulièrement dans le cas des délé
gations générales du Québec a l'étranger et des
ententes avec la France dans les domaines de 1'
éducation et de la culture.
...Quatrièmement, l'évolution normale du ministère
des Affaires fédérales-provinciales dont les respon
sabilités actuelles comprennent non seulement les
relations de Québec avec le gouvernement central et
les gouvernements des autres provinces mais, aussi,
par la force des choses, les relations du Québec
avec tous les autres gouvernements...(Débats. 13
avril 1967 , p. 2167 ).
While in its operation, the new department would direct
its efforts toward two major sectors, that of federal-pro
vincial relations and that of international relations, the
latter field was by far the most contentious.

Assurances

that "cette initiative ne vise pas a donner au Québec des
droits qu'il n'aurait pas" were given both by Johnson and by
the new Department's Deputy Minister, Claude Morin (in
Debats, 13 avril 1967, p. 2170 and in be Devoir, p. 178
respectively).

Nonetheless, many believed this to be a new

manifestation of Quebec's international ambitions.

To be

sure, arguments in favour of the bill and duties assigned
to the Department, did nothing to mitigate those concerns.
Gerin-Lajoie, particularly,

in expressing the Opposition's
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support for the bill, provoked, rather than allayed, federal
fears:
...On I'a assez souligné, ce projet de loi ne confère
au Québec aucun pouvoir nouveau dans les affaires
internationales.
Il constitue cependant une nouvelle
étape, un pas de plus dans l'affirmation de role et
d'une personnalité de nature internationale pour le
Québec.
En créant un organisme administratif chargé
de coordonner toutes ses activités k l'extérieur du
Québec, le gouvernement pose un geste qui indique
clairement sa détermination à poursuivre et a dévelop
per les realizations que le Québec a déjà à son crédit
depuis cinq ou six ans...(Débats, 13 avril 196?,
p. 2173).
Administratively, the Department of Intergovernmental
Affairs was assigned several functions apart from those
which dealt with federal-provincial matters (Morin in Le
Devoir, p. I8l).

The Minister would take charge of all

Quebec delegations and agencies abroad; he would be respon
sible for the administration of all Franco-Quebec ententes
and, to this end, would collaborate closely with the Depart
ments of Education and Cultural Affairs; he would conduct
whatever negotiations might be necessary "lorsque le Quebec
jugera opportun d'établir, dans les domaines de sa com
pétence, des relations plus étendues avec l'étranger" (Morin,
in Le Devoir, p. 181); he would cooperate with federal
foreign aid officials, for the purpose of sending Quebec
educators and specialists to developing countries; he would
actively concern himself with those certain international
organizations and bodies with which Quebec desired to parti
cipate; and finally, he would coordinate the interest and
research of the various Quebec departments in so far as
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these pertained to the numerous international conventions

which Canada could not implement without provincial assent.
In addition to these duties, the Minister would preside

over a cabinet committee of intergovernmental affairs.
However controversial Bill 33
speaking Canada, and especially to

appeared to EnglishOttawa, it was regarded .

12

-

as a natural, logical step in Quebec

.

It merely harmoni

zed various executive and legislative efforts.

Indeed, for

Peyton Lyon, other provinces would be wise to follow suit
(Le Devoir, 20 mars 196?, p. 4).
The advent of May only exacerbated the Ottawa-Quebec
dispute.

In the provincial legislature on May 2, Premier

Johnson spoke of Quebec's right to represent French Canada
outside the country;

Later that week, he spoke in Montreal

to the St. Jean Baptiste societies.

Here he warned the

federal government not to conclude international agreements
covering subjects under provincial jurisdiction, without
first consulting the provinces;

Ottawa could not expect the

province to delegate any of its powers.
reprimanded the federal government

Continuing, he

for its attempts to under

mine Quebec relations with francophone countries;

12

.in instituant un ministère des Affaires ■ inter
gouvemementales, le gouvernement du Quebec veut
assurer l'unité de sa politique en ce qui a trait
a ses relations et a celles de ces ministères et
organismes, avec les gouvernements, ministères
et organismes de l'extérieur du Québec...
(Johnson; Débats, 13 avril 196?, p. 21?0).
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...depuis quatorze mois,«, 1 e fédéral semble pris de
la bougeotte dans le domaine des accords, ententes
ou traités, non pas avec l'Allemagne ou l'Australie,
mais avec les pays francophones...Des que le Québec
s'intéresse à un pays, Ottawa accourt et s'empresse
de le faire dans le giron...(Le Devoir, 8 mai I 967 ,
p. 1 ).
When, less than twenty-four hours later, the federal govern
ment announced the signing of a Canadian-Belgian cultural
agreement which dealt with cultural, academic, scientific
and technical affairs, Johnson admonished Ottawa once again
13
(Le Devoir, 9 mai 1967 , p. 1)
.
During the period of May 18 to 22, 1967, Daniel Johnson
paid an official visit to Paris and opened there a new Delegation-Genérale.

He was well-received by General de Gaulle.

As a result of several private interviews with the French
President and with senior members of the French Cabinet,
the two governments laid the basis for extending projects
of co-operation.

They included a further exchange of tech

nicians and civil servants, the training in France of Quebec
technicians in nuclear research, a study for investment,
and, most controversially, an exchange of radio and television programme through the use of a satellite in whose
According to the O.I.I.A. *s Monthly Report (vol. 6 , p.
6 8 ), the signing of this cultural agreement "...prompted Mr.
Johnson to say that Prince Albert (of Belgium) had been used
by Ottawa as a dupe to help crush Quebec. There were reports
that the provincial protocol department had told Ottawa that
Paul Tremblay, Canadian Ambassador to Belgium, was personne
non grata in the province and should not accompany the
Prince.
Jean Lesage subsequently criticized the Premier
for involving the royal couple in an internal dispute...".
Such unofficial reportings of behind-the-scene movements
were common throughout this period.
Tactics of one-up
manship and the pre-occupation with symbolic gains were soon
to be dubbed "La Guerre des Boutons" by Edward McWhinney
(Confederation Challenge, vol. 2, p. l42).

13
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operations Quebec would participate (O.I.I.A,, Monthly
Report, vol. 6, p. 68).

At home, in Quebec, the signifi

cance of this visit and the value which these programmes
held for Québécois, did not go unnoticed.

Jean-Maro Loger,

writing in Le Devoir, explained;
...Le Quebec est aux prises avec des problèmes très
concrets et, à plusieurs égards, aigus, de développe
ment, d'équipement, de formation des cadres, etc. et
plus généralement d'affirmation de sa personnalité;
la France est redevenue une puissance économique,
scientifique et technique de premier ordre, conduite
naturellement à s'intéresser de façon particulière mars sans exclusive - à l'avancement des pays parta
geant sa langue et sa culture, surtout lorsque, de
sur croit, ils sont issus d'elle-même...(18 mai 196?/
p. 4).
Above all else, 196? wns a year in which Canada general
ly, and Quebec specifically, gained international attention.
Because Canada was celebrating its centenary, Ottawa re
ceived a steady flow of congratulatory heads of state, dip
lomatic functionaries and government officials.

Pew failed

to visit Montreal, host to the international exposition,
and, while in the province, many met with Johnson as well.
The July visit by Charles de Gaulle was least typical, most
provocative, almost historical.

(The General's visit is

well documented in several sources.

See particularly,

Tanturier; Wade, I 968 , vol. 2; C.I.I.A., Monthly Report,
vol. 6).

Nevertheless, despite his visit and speeches, and

the notice which they attracted, they did not, as a result,
14
accelerate the international activities of Quebec
. In

14

Aside from giving international publicity to the
"aspirations" of Québécois and to the close Franco-Quebec
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relationship, de Gaulle's "Québec libre" speech neither
dampened nor expedited, in any direct or noticeable fashion,
the international relations of Quebec.
Laurent Chevalier
disagrees:
,
...le choc psychologique provoque par le voyage du
général et la volonté des deux gouvernements ont fait
progresser a pas de géants la coopération francoquébécoise...(in Bernard, p. 98)*
To this visit Chevalier attributes the marked increase of
Franco-Quebec projects.
Yet the necessary cause-effect re
lationship is nowhere evident and is more or less assumed,
rather than established, by that author.
The direct encour
agement and publicity given to separatist and autonomist
groups within Quebec is the more conspicuous impact, but an
impact upon Quebec's (and Canada's) domestic politics.
If anything, the French President's July visit curtailed,
in the short run, further international initiatives by Quebec.
It was Ottawa who, increasingly, took advantage of the situ
ation and especially after the departures of Johnson and de
Gaulle from the political scene.
Indeed, one can notice a
general shift of focus from "Franco-Quebec relations", to a
triangular "Ottawa-Quobec-Paris" relationship, to the present
"Pranco-Canadian" term.
(Admittedly, the first expression is
still common usage, but Quebec no longer dominates relations
with France, as it once did. This latter development stems
from a proliferation of Quebec's external efforts to ether
francophone countries, and not from a concession to Ottawa's
exclusivity in international affairs.)
The position that de Gaulle's visit and speech had little
direct bearing upon Quebec's international relations, seems to
be confirmed by the President's later remarks (July 31 and
November 2?) which dealt exclusively with Canadian-Quebec
internal politics.
In addition, the position of the Johnson
government was quite vague:
...Premier Johnson at first seemed mildly critical of
the de Gaulle performance and appeared to be disassocia
ting himself from it. Later he denied this and supported
the General, declaring that he was only saluting the
freedom of choice of Quebec to select its own political
and economic destiny...(G.I.I.A., Monthly Report, vol.
6, p. 91);
and later,
...While attending the Confederation of Tomorrow con
ference in Toronto Premier Johnson of Quebec was
questioned about the de Gaulle and Pearson statements.
He described the exchange as a private fight between
de Gaulle and the Prime Minister in which he should
not get involved...(C.I.I.A,, Monthly Reoort, vol. 6,
p. 131 )'
Marcel Rioux paints a similar picture:
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fact, only one further entry Is recorded « on August 23,
France announced an increase in technical and economic aid
to Quebec, intended, in the words of de Gaulle,

"to help

the French of Canada to maintain and develop their person
ality" (O.I.I.A,, Monthly Report, vol. 6, p. 92).
Quebec's attendance at the 1968 Conference of African
and Malagasy Ministers of National Education provided the
new pivot around which the on-going debate would revolve.
Pearson, perhaps in anticipation, had written to the Quebec
Premier as early as December 1, 1967" His letter suggested
that arrangements be agreed upon between the two governments
with resoect to la Francophonie generally, which would allow
15
for full Quebec participation in Canadian representation
TVTDaniel Johnson seemed to have trouble keeping up
with what was going on, and appeared embarrassed by
de Gaulle's friendliness towards Quebec. Right up to
his death, Johnson continued to give reassurances to
both parties of the conflict...(p. 82).
De Gaulle's speeches, if they had blatantly recognized
the international personality and competence of Quebec,
would have afforded an opportunity upon which Johnson might,
have capitalized. However, these speeches made no such
mention, nor was the Premier in a firm policy position to
take full advantage. Therefore, we can conclude from this,
and from Quebec's lack of external activities for the rest
of 1967 , that the visit of de Gaulle played no substantial
and influential role in the international relations of
Quebec.

13

This letter is reproduced in Federalism and Interna
tional Conferences on Education (p. 62-6<J, and reads in
part ;
...The composition of the Canadian delegation will, of
course, be dependent on the subject matter of the
meeting. If such a meeting, for instance, should deal
with questions of a general character, or with exter
nal aid, it would then seem desirable for the Secretary
of State for External Affairs to lead the Canadian de
legation, which I would hope would also include strong
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The Quebec-Ottawa discussions subsequently arranged, came to
no agreement.
In January 1968 , the government of Gabon invited Quebec's
Minister of Education, Jean-Guy Cardinal, to an educational
conference to be held in Libreville, February 3-10, France,
Quebec and fifteen independent francophone African states
attended. All delegations were represented at the ministerial
level. The federal government, having failed in its attempts
to procure a "Canadian" invitation for a "Canadian" delega
tion, suspended diplomatic relations with the Republic of
Gabon. This move was based on the fact that the Gabonese
government had sent the invitation directly to the government
of Quebec, and not via the intermediary of Ottawa. For the
federal government, this was "an exercise in diplomatic
brinkmanship" (McWhinney in Confederation Challenge, vol. 2,
16
p. 127 ) .
representation from Quebec. If, on the other hand, the
purpose of the conference was, for example, to deal
exclusively with education, it would then be appropriate
for the Minister of Education of Quebec to be a member
of the Canadian delegation, if such was your wish.
Needless to say, he should occupy within this delegation
a place appropriate to his position, taking into account
the nature of the conference. In certain cases, the
Quebec Minister might well be the head of the Canadian
delegation...

16

This so-called "Gabon crisis" had all the elements of
the Theatre of the Absurd, according to McWhinney : the Ga 
bonese, in a note dated January 20, had insisted that the
invitation was purely personal; Paul Martin, in his reply
to the Gabonese Ambassador, declared that in attempting to
interpret the Canadian constitution Gabon had acted in a way
"which is neither in conformity with international law, nor
with the maintenance of close and friendly relations between
our two countries" (C.I.I.A., Monthly Report, vol. 7, p. 32);
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Following the Libreville conference, the federal govern
ment again communicated with Quebec authorities in the hope
of establishing some formula for the composition of future
delegations. In a letter of March 8 , Pearson re-emphasized
his dual purpose : to allow Quebec full participation, but
"in a manner which would be compatible with the continued
existence of a sovereign and independent Canada"

(Federalism

and International Conferences on Education, p, 66 ). Other
wise, if the Gabon affair were repeated in some form or
fashion, the unified structure of Canada and/or Canada's
presence abroad would be seriously threatened :
...That structure and that presence would certainly be
weakened - and ultimately destroyed - if other countries
invited Canadian provinces to international conferences
of states, if those provinces accepted the invitation,
and if the provincial delegates were treated formally as
representatives of states while the Government of Canada
was ignored...(Federalism and International Conferences
on Education, p. 68 ).
In April 1968 , the Conference of African and Malagasy
Ministers of National Education re-convened in Paris. It came
and went without an open diplomatic clash between Canada and
Pearson criticized Quebec, while Trudeau, at a March press
conference, expressed his conviction that France was behind
the move by Gabon; Gabon suggested that Canada had suspended
relations to divert Canadian public opinion from the reality
of the Quebec problem, and furthermore, that Canada had
reneged on its'offer of aid; lastly, Quebec officials were
denying the Pearson statement that Quebec had been invited
to head a Canadian delegation. It was not until June I 969 »
that Canada re-established relations with Gabon. At that
time, a Gabon delegation visited both Ottawa and Quebec, and
the immediate subject of the Ottawa-Gabon-Quebec quarrels
"was revealed to have been no more than the exchange of some
half dozen teachers and students and the provision of tech
nical assistance in staffing a new public health centre in
Libreville" (McWhinney in Confederation Challenge, vol. 2,
p. 128 ).
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France, even though Pearson and his successor Trudeau, had
both indicated in March that "if France by-passed Ottawa and
invited Quebec to Paris, she could expect the same treatment
as that given the Gabonese" (O.I.I.A,, Monthly Report, vel.
7, P* 4^). Early in the month, the Canadian Prime Minister
had sent a third personal letter to Daniel Johnson still
urging arrangements for a mutually-acceptable delegation.
17
Johnson's only response to the three letters
preceded by
twenty-four hours his government's announcement that Cardinal
would attend the Paris conference. But the circumstances
surrounding this conference differed from those which resulted
in the suspension of Canadian-Gabonese relations. In the first
place, the meeting was scheduled as "a second stage" of the
Libreville conference. Secondly, France attempted to empha
size this natural continuity. Hoping to avoid a dispute with
Canada, the French government sent "reminders" to previous
delegates, rather than invitations. Finally, as reported in
17

Partially startled and somewhat angered by the federal
government's publication (in Federalism and International
Conferences on Education) of Mr. Pearson's "personal and
confidential" letters to him, Daniel Johnson tabled his own
letter in the National Assembly on May 9, I968 (Débats, p.
1430 ). In it, the Quebec Premier regretted Pearson's depar
ture from political life and praised his "openness to dia
logue"* Concerning the matter at hand, however, Johnson was
frank :
...There is nowhere in the Canadian constitution a dis
position so fundamental and over which jurisdiction of
the provinces has been so firmly established as educa
tion.,.(Glpbe_and_Moll, May 10 1968 , p. 11).
He went on to say that the federal government was using its
exclusive jurisdiction over international affairs as a
counter-argument. This would have to be settled by negotia
tion, In the meantime, Quebec could only assume all its
responsibilities.
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the speeches .and statements of Johnson, Cardinal, Pearson
and Trudeau, the atmosphere in Quebec and in Ottawa seemed
more optimistic (C.I.I.A., Monthly Report, vol. 7, p. 43-44).
18
Nevertheless, Ottawa was not completely at ease
. Jules
leger, Canada's Ambassador to Prance, had been summoned home;
it was not until four days after arriving that his presence
in Ottawa was known. Following several discussions with
Messrs. Pearson and Trudeau,

and after the Cabinet met to

study the situation further, the Canadian Ambassador returned.
With him, Mr, Leger took a note which, on the instructions of
the Canadian government, was to be delivered personally to
French Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville. While
Mitchell Sharp in Ottawa refused to divulge the contents of
that note, his comments indicated three elements ; (a) a re
statement of federal claims of supremacy in international
relations;

(b) regrets that France had not communicated

through Ottawa to Quebec;

and (c).a desire for good relations

with France (Globe and Mai l , May 4 I968 , p. 1). This "low-

,

key" note, according to Sharp, would close the entire inci
dent.
18

The federal government was particularly dismayed by the
formalities accorded Cardinal *
...The Canadian Government was never officially informed
of the status of the Quebec delegation at the Paris
meeting,..it appears from the proceedings of the con
ference that he (Jean-Guy Cardinal) participated on the
same basis as other delegates. In the case of the Paris
session, the Quebec Minister stated after the conference
that Quebec had participated on the same basis as other
delegations...(Federalism and International Conferences
on Education, p. 38 ).
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In Canada, however, the issue was far from dead. To the
Montreal Chamber of Commerce, Premier Johnson declared that
Quebec would continue to set precedents in international re
lations until Canada had a new constitution respecting the
provinces' exclusive rights and Canada's general interests.
The recent international diplomacy moves by his government
were regarded, assured the Premier, as "necessary, legitimate
and reasonable" by all provincial legislators and a vast
majority of citizens. Indeed, Quebec, like the other pro
vinces, had possessed exclusive (and therefore sovereign)
powers in education since 186?, and while these powers were
originally exercised only internally,

in the modern world,

this was no longer possible :
...Quebec can no longer fulfil its constitutional tasks
without extending its internal spheres to the inter
national level.,,We can no longer act in a vacuum...If
we want to progress, we must start exchanges and esta
blish bonds of co-operation with other provinces and
countries...(Globe and Mai l , May ? I 968 , p. 3 I).
Johnson did concede that Ottawa had the responsibility for
directing Canada's foreign policy in certain traditional
areas (such as war and peace, monetary policies, tariffs,
commercial treaties) but, "when it involves education problems,
what can the federal government truly do or say...It has
absolutely no power in the matter...".
The reply to Johnson was not long in coming. The next
two days, on May 8 and 9; the federal government had much to
say and much to do. A 38-page study. Federalism and Inter
national Conferences on Education, was released by the Sec
retary of State for External Affairs and, at a press
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conference In Ottawa, Trudeau made it plain that he would
consider a Liberal victory at the polls on June 23 as a man
date to challenge Quebec's international ambitions (Globe and
M a i l , May 9 1968, p. 1 and 8 ). Later in the month, Trudeau's
campaign statement on foreign policy stressed the development
of closer relationships between the federal government and
francophone countries. New missions, increased aid, more
cultural programmes were promised (C.I.I.A., Monthly Report,
vol. 7, p. 54).
Quebec, momentarily put on the defensive, found no
source of strength for its position in the conflict with
Ottawa when Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba paid a May
state visit to Ottawa and Montreal. The Tunisian President
was asked by reporters whether his country would develop
closer ties with Quebec. His response was brief i until
proved to the contrary, Quebec belonged to Canada (Globo and
M a i l , May 11 1968, p. 11). Later, in Montreal, he was quoted
as expressing confidence that Quebec could preserve its
identity and come into closer contact with French-speaking
nations without breaking from Canada (C.I.I.A., Monthly
Report, vol. 7, P* 54).
During July and August I968 , there were no confronta
tions on 8 ministerial level between Quebec and Ottawa. Daniel
Johnson's July visit to Paris had been cancelled because of
illness. When the Department of External Affairs was forming
a Canadian delegation for the UNESCO conference on educational
planning (Paris, August 6-l4), Quebec declined to
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19
participate

. Later in August, Quebec did send two obser

vers with the Canadian delegation to. the UN conference on
exploration and peaceful uses of outer space. The agenda in
cluded discussions of the use of satellites for communica
tions resource surveys and the impact of space activities
on education.
There was one additional non-incident. Reportedly (Globe
and Mail, August 9 1968, P* 3), Quebec had sent a four-man
mission to certain francophone African states (Gabon, Chad,
Niger and Senegal) to investigate their needs in education
and health services. On this, Claude Morin refused comment.
The absence of a firm federal response seems to imply that,
at least in the area of foreign aid, Quebec and Ottawa had
reached some modus vivendi. Both in Federalism and Inter
national Relations (p. 37-39), and in its supplement,
Federalism and International Conferences on Education (p.
42-46 and 32-54), an active provincial role in foreign aid
was recognized *
...an effective aid programme depends for its realiza
tion upon full co-operation from the provinces...
...the Federal Government welcomes provincial contributions...
19

When questioned on the absence of a Quebec representative
on the delegation, Mr. Morin explained. Because there had
been no agreement yet on the status of Quebec in participating
in international conferences, the province, although having
been invited, refused to join the Canadian delegation. Ne
gotiations on the rights of the province were still in pro
gress and if Quebec had accepted Ottawa's invitation it
could be interpreted to mean that the province agreed to
Ottawa's viewpoint that Quebec cannot act independently in
attending international meetings (Le Devoir, 24 juillet 1968,
p. 1 ).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

...the Federal Government is anxious to (act) in as
flexible a manner as possible...
...clear recognition should be given to the provincial
role...
Cardinal had given an indication of his government's posi
tion in April, when Quebec educational aid to Gabon was
rumoured. At a press conference, the Minister of Education
said that Quebec did not consider its plans for educational
co-operation as competing with Ottawa, but as supplementary
(Globe and Ma i l , April 29 1968, p, 2), When compared to
statements on other issues concerning external relations,
these remarks appear quite moderate. In any case, the
reported August mission brought no public rebuke from
federal government circles.
In late November 1968 , questions of the conferenop in
Niger first arose. The new Quebec Premier, Jean-Jacques
Bertrand, announced on November 26 that his government had
received an invitation to participate in the conference,
and that this invitation had not been obtained through
Ottawa (le Devoir, 2? novembre I968 , p. 1). Mr. Trudeau, in
the House, announced that his government had received their
invitation as early as November 17, and that, since it was
a conference of French-speaking countries in general, the
Canadian delegation would represent "all Canadians and
particularly French-speaking Canadians who, as you know,
do not live only in the province of Quebec but also in
other provinces..."(Commons Debates, November 27 1968 , p.
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20

32?4)

. Until the following February, the question would

remain open.
January 19&9 began yet another year in which Quebec
actively pursued an international role. A provincial dele
gation led by Cardinal and Beaudry paid a five-day visit to
Paris, January 22-2?, in order to strengthen Franco-Quebec
relations. Upon arrival, the delegation was greeted with
"full diplomatic and political honours" (Globe and Mai l ,
January 2] 1969, P* 1), while the Canadian Ambassador,
at the airport, received no special recognition,

also

and more

over, in what appeared to be a diplomatic snub, was not
invited to that night's dinner at the Elysee Palace. Having
attracted much initial attention, the Quebec delegation was
soon meeting privately with French government leaders.
Their talks resulted in three letters of agreement ; (a)
work on a possible Franco-Quebec telecommunications satel
lite;

(b) help from Paris for the new University of Quebec;

and (c) increased promotion of French involvement in the
provincial economy (C.I.I.A., Monthly Report, vol. 8 , p. 10)
For Mr. Cardinal, these agreements did not constitute
"accords". Mitchell Sharp, for whom the satellite agreement
20

On the same day, it was reported in the Globe and Mail
(November 27, p. 3) that Paul Martin might interrupt his
tour of African countries to visit Niger and discuss plans
for the conference. Three days later. President Diori of
Niger held a press conference following his talks with
Senator Martin. There he expressed Canada's intentions of
sending a "Canadian" delegation composed of representatives
from ail French-speaking provinces. He announced at the
same time that Canada had offered "special aid" to Niger
(Globe and Mail, November 30 I968 , p. 4).
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was of primary concern, expressed similar views :
...The Canadian Government wishes to reserve its posi
tion with regard to these documents (agreements). It
intends to study them carefully to determine whether
they come within the framework of agreements concluded
by Canada and Prance. In any event, these documents in
themselves would not constitute international agree
ments. Moreover, constitutional responsibility in the
field of telecommunications devolves upon the Govern
ment of Canada which would mean that every project
carried out in this field will involve action on the
part of the Canadian Government. It is, therefore,
clear that all international co-operation concerning
satellite communications requires the concurrence and
full co-operation of the Canadian Government...(Globe
and Mail, January 23 1969 , p. 3 ).
later,

in the House of Commons, after he had received and

studied the letters in question, Mr. Sharp reaffirmed his
previous opinion ;
...these documents could not of themselves constitute
international agreements, and in this connection I have
since noted the statements of representatives of the
Quebec government that the documents wore not Intended
by Quebec to constitute intergovernmental agreements
...(Commons Debates, January 31 I969 , p. 4981).
The "satellite" letter of agreement was an issue over which
Quebec apparently wished no confrontation. At his Quebec
press conference on January 30 , Mr. Cardianl was quite con
ciliatory. Co-operation between France and Quebec could
lead to a joint launching of a communications satellite, he
said, "but not before studies and discussions involving the
federal government" (Globe and Mai l , January 3 I I969 , p. 1)*
However, he added that,

because the other matters were

exclusively in Quebec's jurisdiction, only the satellite
proposal would be discussed.
There occurred another event during January which
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brought the federal and Quebec governments close to full
agreement. This was the Kinshasa conference of education
ministers, January I3 -I 8 . Prior to that conference, a
series of telegrams exchanged between Messrs. Trudeau and
Bertrand produced a tentative agreement whereby the Quebec
delegation, duly identified, would join with other repre
sentatives of the Canadian delegation. Of special importance
were those proposals set forth by Trudeau in his telegram
21
of January 8 . They suggested means by which Quebec might
properly assert its own particular identity within the
larger Canadian delegation. These included suggestions
21

...The Minister from Quebec will speak on behalf of
Quebec on all matters falling within Quebec's consti
tutional jurisdiction. The delegates from the other
provinces will do likewise. As far as the Canadian de
legation as such is concerned, its opinions will be
expressed by the chairman or co-chairmen...
...Quebec's presence may be identified in the following
manner ; (a) during the opening or closing sittings,
the chairman of the sitting or the other speakers may
identify Quebec and the other provinces by appropriate
mention; (b) the documents produced by Quebec or the
other provinces on subjects within their constitu
tional jurisdiction will be brought forward in their
name and will bear their distinctive mark; nevertheless,
these documents will be placed before the conference
by the Canadian delegation in a dossier emanating from
this delegation and containing all the documents sub
mitted by the provinces; (c) the automobile of Quebec's
delegates will bear a plate with the double mention
Canada and Quebec and a miniature Quebec flagj (d) the
flag of Quebec may be raised over the hotel in which
the Quebec minister resides; (e) Quebec's flag will be
displayed in the conference room, or outside this room,
where the various flags are hung, provided that it is
in company with the flag of Canada, precedence being
given to the latter...
...In the event of a possible vote at the conference,
Canada, including Quebec, will have only one vote. If
the members of the delegation cannot reach an agreement,
Canada will ab 8 tain...(G.I,I.A., Monthly Report, vol. 8 ,
p. ij).
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regarding documentation, the display of flags, voting pro
cedures, chairmanship, and matters of general diplomatic
import. Reporting from Kinshasa, the Globe and Mail
(January 13 1969, P* 2?) confirmed that the actual arrange
ments at the conference followed generally the suggestions
made by Prime Minister Trudeau, but that the details had
been worked out only after the federal and Quebec represen
tatives, travelling separately, had arrived in the city.
If the Kinshasa formula for representation implied a
modicum of harmony between the positions of Ottawa and of
Quebec, the federal-provincial constitutional conference
confirmed it. On February 12, Quebec Premier Bertrand tabled
his government's Document de travail sur les relations avec
l'étrangor. Quebec was clearly not retreating from its
demand for an international role. Yet the proposed ground
rules for international conferences (p. 26 - 28 ) embodied
much of the Kinshasa agreement. In addition, where matters
of provincial jurisdiction wore concerned, the paper recog
nized the federal government's right to veto agreements
between provinces and foreign governments, but only if such
agreements were proven incompatible with Canada's general
foreign policy (p. 23), Quebec, in return, asked for prior

consultation when Ottawa embarked upon international agreemonts in the fields of concurrent or full provincial juris
diction. It was evident, then, that bargaining had begun
and, as Quebec wished, on a constitutional level.
The question of appropriate representation at the Niamey
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conference, February 17-20, was the subject of much discus
sion at this same time.

(The conference was to discuss the

possibility of establishing an international agency to co
ordinate aid and exchange amongst French-speaking nations;
as previously mentioned, both the Quebec and Canadian
governments had received invitations to participate.) Marc
Lalonde and Claude Morin met early in the month to discuss
arrangements, but Prime Minister Trudeau in reply to a
Commons question, assured the House that the delegation's
composition would not be similar to that of Kinshasa :
...In Niamey, the conference will deal with several
subjects over which the federal government has juris
diction. Therefore, we intend to send federal ministers
as delegates, as opposed to Kinshasa where the con
ference was on e d u c a t i o n , a subject which concerns only
indirectly the federal government. That is why we sent
officials there while all the provinces sent ministers
...(Commons Debates, February 3 1969, P* 5175)*
Within a week, Bertrand announced that "thé Quebec delega
tion will go to Niger and join the Canadian delegation and
there it will represent Quebec on matters of education and
culture" (Globe and M a i l , February 11 I 969 , P* 3)* Agreement
on participation at the conference had been reached. While
Marcel Masse would head the Quebec delegation, the federal
Secretary of State, Gerard Pelletier, would be sole leader
of the "all-Canadian" delegation. In this capacity, Mr.
Pelletier would exercise the single Canadian vote; but, in
event of disagreement among the delegates, he would abstain.
The federal announcement stressed, however, that "the ar
rangements between Quebec and Ottawa would not bind either
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government in the search for a permanent solution to the
dispute over dealings on matters of foreign affairs within
provincial jurisdiction" (O.I.I.A., Monthly Reoort, vol. 8 ,
p. 48).
At Niamey, the conference agreed to establish an
Agencé de cooperation culturelle et technique des pays
francophones, and Jean-Marc leger (an able advocate of
Quebec's international role) was appointed provisional exe
cutive secretary to draft a charter.
government,

The Canadian federal

for its part, threw strong financial support

behind the embryonic agency.

Not only did it pledge pp to

thirty per cent of the budget, but Mr. Pelletier also an
nounced that the volume of Canadian aid to francophone
countries would be vastly expanded in the next few years
(External Affairs, vol. XXI, no. 3, u, 21?).

22
Nevertheless, during the conference,

even as before

,

disagreement arose over federal and Quebec representations.
On the official list of governments represented at the con
ference, Canada and Quebec were given separate listings.
22

From the statements of Trudeau and Bertrand, firm
agreement had been reached.
However, according to the C.I.
I.A.'s Monthly Reoort, Mr. Marcel Masse held a somewhat dif
ferent opinion:
...(on February 1 3 ) . ..Mr. Masse was reported by the
Canadian Press as saying that there would be no link
between the Quebec and the federal delegations and
that not having co-chairmen meant Quebec would not
have to consult "Ottawa" on matters involving culture
and education.
Spokesmen for the federal government
denied the assertion by Mr. Masse, saying that the
agreement made by Prime Minister Trudeau and Premier
Bertrand was specific on this point...(vol. 8 , p. 48).
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thus producing a series of procedural disputes concerning
the identification and status of Canadian and Quebec dele
gates.

Not until the following year, when the founding con

ference met, were these problems solved.
The summer of 19&9 came on an optimistic note.

A new

policy of detente between Quebec and Ottawa on the one hand,
and Prance and Ottawa on the other, seemed to be taking
shape.

Premier Bertrand revealed that, in July, Claude

Morin had delivered to French President Pompidou a personal
message in which the Quebec Premier expressed his desire to
maintain close relations with France without neglecting the
relations with Canada,

he Devoir interpreted this as a

break with the politics and strategy of the late Daniel
Johnson (19 août 1969, p. 1); with similar thoughts, the
federal government warmly welcomed the Bertrand statement
(Le Devoir, 20 août I 969 , P* 1)»

Pragmatism, reasonableness

and the elements of commonsense and mutual co-operation were
being emphasized by Sharp federally, by Bertrand provincially.

The de Lipkowski affair brought this to an end.

From the moment Mr..Jean de Lipkowski arrived in Quebec
on October 9, 1969 , Ottawa, Quebec and Paris plunged once
again into the throes of controversy.

The French Minister

of State for Foreign Affairs was in Quebec on the invitation
of Marcel Masse, then Quebec Minister of Intergovernmental
Affairs, and was heading a five-man delegation of top French
government officials.

Although he had been formally in

vited to visit Ottawa (the invitation having been renewed
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on three separate occasions), Mr. de lipkowski declined.
His non-acceptance, he insisted (le Devoir, 11 octobre I 969 ,

p. 3 )» did not constitute an affront to Ottawa since his
visit was made within the framework of the existing OttawaParis-Quebec arrangements (i.e. the accord cadre of 19&5)'
For many, this was a deliberate snub to the Canadian govern
ment.

The controversy began.
On October l4, de Lipkowski spoke of plans for the

Franoo-Quebec telecommunications satellite;
...he,..declared that such a project was authorized by
the Canada-France "umbrella agreement", by reason of
the fact that the Canadian constitution of 186? was
silent on telecommunications and the fact also that
the France-Quebec project had a cultural and educa
tional bent - matters within provincial competence...
(McWhinney in Confederation Challenge, vol. 2, p.
144) 23
This prompted Prime Minister Trudeau to characterize the
French official as "impertinent",

"impolite", and "grossly

misinformed" (this latter in particular reference to his
comments on the Canadian constitution), and to threaten a

23

When contrasted with other statements he is reported
to have made, this seems quite conservative.
Compare, for
example, the following: ...he said Prance must help Quebeckers in their "lonely
battle" for national identity and could no longer re
main indifferent to Quebeckers' struggle for survival..,
...de lipkowski told a press conference that "There's
been no change" in the French foreign policy with res
pect to Ottawa and Quebec since the departure of
President de Gaulle.
He said that the decision to
bypass Ottawa had been made by the French government,
that a decision to visit Ottawa after the election of
President Pompidou might have indicated that France
now recognized the federal government's "monopoly"
over Franco-Quebec relations...(C.I.I.A., Monthly
Report, vol. 8, p. 233)»
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change, or if necessary,

a denunciation of the Franco-Cana-

dian "umbrella agreement".

Mr. Masse defended his guest,

accusing the federal government of creating unnecessary pro
blems through its lack of flexibility.

French Foreign Mini

ster Maurice Schumann also supported his official.
Accusations, counter-accusations and rumours, either
directly or indirectly related to the affair, continued
throughout October and November.

In December, the de lip-

kowski affair ended as suddenly as it had begun*
.k.The French government apparently decided quietly to
ignore the Ottawa protest note over the de Dipkowski
affair, and Ottawa, in turn, apparently decided
quietly to ignore the French government's ignoring of
its protest note; and the Quebec government, for its
part, chose not to involve itself further, publicly,
in this latest Ottawa-Paris conflict...(McWhinney in
Confederation Challenge, vol. 2, p. 149). 24
}
By far the best account of this affair occurs in McWhinney's article (Confederation Challenge, vol. 2, p, l42130 ). His observations and conclusions are worthy of note*
...The de lipkowski affair itself seems to have
stemmed from political events beyong the immediate
control either of the professional Foreign Ministers
in Ottawa or in Paris, or of the Quebec Premier...
(p. 118)
...it was hardly possible to avoid the conclusion that
an undue amount of time and energy had been invested
by all three capitals - Ottawa, Quebec, and Paris - in
an affair of disproportionately slight social value;
and that, whatever issues of constitutional principle
may have been involved at the beginning, the war had
now become trivial and farcical...no one of the parties
could now emerge with much political profit or advan
tage...(p. 149;.
In substance, the de Lipkowski affair played an insignificant
part in the international relations of Quebec.
In form,
however, it typified the politics through which Quebec
struggled to assure itself of an international role.
Often
third or even fourth parties were drawn into what was es
sentially a domestic, an Ottawa-Quebec, or federal-provin
cial, dispute.
The trivial, farcical, ill-mannered extremes
to which all parties resorted in the pursuit of symbolic
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The trend towards reasonableness which had begun in
the summer resumed in December 19&9'

Schumann and Sharp

met'at the Brussels NATO Council meeting and, after a long
private discussion, apparently agreed to avoid similar in
cidents in the future (le Devoir, 6 deoembre I 969 , p.2).
Bertrand and Sharp had previously agreed on arrangements for
Quebec-Ganadian representation at the up-coming Paris con
ference of francophone education ministers (le Devoir, 26
novembre I 969 , p* I 6 ).
...Everything thus pointed finally to a polite and
essentially pragmatic accommodation among the three
parties - Ottawa, Quebec, and Paris - reflecting at
once the commonsense and moderation of their principal
spokesmen in recent weeks, federal External AfTairs
Minister Sharp, Quebec Premier Bertrand, and French
Foreign Minister Schumann...(%cWhinney in Confedera
tion Challenge, vol. 2, p. I 50 ).
By 1970 , at least the question of Quebec's attendance
at educational conferences seemed to be closed.

Following

the conclusion of arrangements for the conference at Mauri
tania, February 23-26, Mr. Sharp declared to the House that
"the principles that were followed in the past for atten
dance at educational ministers' conferences are well esta
blished and will be followed" (International Canada, 1970,
p. 31)'

Quebec led the Canadian delegation.

Despite the apparent solution to this problem, there
remained considerable disagreement over several issues sur
rounding the constitutional conference (for the Agence de
gains, fortunately gave way to a "new recognition of the
merits of co-operative federalism" (p. 116).
If the de
lipkowski.affair produced anything of benefit, it was cer
tainly this.
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- 71 coopération), to be held in Niamey, March 16-20.

Particular

negotiations which had begun in January, continued through
February and into March.

(One will recall that general dis

cussions began at the first Niamey conference one year be
fore.)

Proposals and counter-proposals wore exchanged be

tween federal and provincial officials, and finally, between
Trudeau and Bertrand.

That such lengthy and laborious bar

gaining should precede this Niamey conference, did not sur
prise one observer, Jean-Charles Bonenfant.

For him, it

was very much a "rapprochement historique"*
ja conférence...a été pour le Québec l'occasion de
faire valoir ses désirs d'activité extérieure car elle
posait les trois problèmes classiques d'une telle
activité, celui de la representation, celui de la sig
nature d'un accord et celui^de la participation à une
organisme international..«(Etudes Internationales,
juin 1970 , p. 86).
On March 13, final arrangements had been concluded*
Quebec delegates would be part of the Canadian delegation
which Gerard Pelletier would again head; the leader of the
Quebec delegation would act as vice-chairman; Canada would
vote with one voice, or abstain; but, in matters of provin
cial jurisdiction, the Quebec delegate would speak in the
name of his government; Quebec would be allowed to display
its flag in company with that of Canada, with the latter
taking precedence; a similar procedure applied with respect
to name plaques; Mr. Pelletier would sign the charter first,
in the name of Canada,

followed by the signatures of pro

vincial representatives;

Quebec, like the other interested

provinces, would be adequately represented on the commissions
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and committees of the Agency, according to the subjectmatters discussed; and lastly, Canada and Quebec would share
equally the Canadian delegation's financial contribution to
the budget (Etudes Internationales, juin 1970, p. 88- 89 ).
At the conference, however, one hurdle remained:
...la Prance...avait demandé que oo soit non seulement
les Etats souverains qui fassent partie de l'organi
sation mais aussi les gouvernements, les institutions
et les associations dont la compétence sqrait com
patible avec la vocation de l'Agence...(Etudes Inter
nationales, juin 1970 , p. 89 ).
This proposai, which would have allowed Quebec full member
ship, was opposed by the Canadian federal government,

as

the latter "reserved the right to deal with foreign coun
tries" (International Canada, 1970, p. 6I).

Following a

prolonged debate, whereby the Agency's existence was at
25
times placed in jeopardy, an agreement was reached
. Bu^
neither Quebec nor Ottawa spoke in terms of victory or do-

26
feat at the conclusion of the conference

25

.

The compromise

This agreement constitutes article 3, subsection 3 of
the Agency's Charter:
...Dans le plein respect de la/Souverainete et de la
competence internationale des Etats membres, tout
gouvernement peut être admis comme gouvernement parti
cipant aux institutions, aux activités et aux progngmmes de l'Agence, sous réserve de l'approbation de
l'Etat membre dont relève le territoire sur lequel le
gouvernement participant concerné exerce son autorité
et selon les mqdalites convenues entre ce gouvernement
et celui de l'Etat membre...
^
Both documents, la Convention relative a l'Agence de 00opération culturelle et technique and la Charte de l'Agence
ge coopération culturelle et techique, are reproduced in
Etudes Internationales, juin 1970, p. 91-101.

26

Michel Roy, who was at Niamey, explained the reasons
for this restraint:
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had been semi-satisfactory for both parties:

Ottawa en-

sured that Canadian representation as an international entity would not be split; Quebec succeeded, nevertheless,

in

joining for the first time, an international organization.
For McWhinney, this second Niamey conference "may.,,
have been in the nature of the last storm, preceding a final
calm" (Confederation Challenge, vol. 2, p. 13^).

Events to

date, having been devoid of those verbal diplomatic/consti
tutional battles of the past, seem to verify that statement.
Particularly since the April 1970 election in Quebec, the
principles of federal comity have formed the basis for re
lations between Quebec and la francophonie,

and Canada and

la francophonie.
The new Quebec Premier, Robert Bourassa, has given the
external relations of his province a new direction.

While

not minimizing cultural relations - "les relations cul
turelles avec la France sont fondamentales"

(Bourassa/

Québec:, p. 31) - Bourassa has given economic issues first,
priority:
...il faut "asseoir la coopération culturelle sur la
coopération économique"...(Bourassa/Québec!, p. 31).
The previous pre-occupation with symbols has therefore suf
fered, having been replaced by more pragmatic goals and issues,
...ce n'est pas seulement par prudence, parce qu'ils
se trouvaient à l'étranger, ou par diplomatie pour
éviter de heurtep les autres pa^s participants, que
le secrétaire d'Etat et le secrétaire-général du
Conseil exécutif du Québec se sont abstenus soigneuse
ment d'employer ce vocabulaire.
C'est surtout que la
réalité de l'entente, les conditions dans^lesquelles
elle a été réalisé et, enfin, la portée veritable de
l'accord-ne le justifiaient pas...(Le Devoir, 23 mars
1970 , p. 1 ).
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In conclusion, Quebec's presence internationally has
not been changed, but rather "normalized":
...on peut donc conclure que rien d'essentiel n'est
changé 'dans les relations extérieures du Québec, mais
que par suite de la presence h Québec d'un nouveau
gouvernement qui coincide avec une transformation de
l'attitude de la France elles semblent devoir prendre
une orientation différente qui sera moins politique et
plus économique et qui se précisera sans coup d'éclat
a l'intérieu^ des structures actuelles du fédéralisme
canadien...(Etudes Internationales, septembre 1970,
p. 76 )'
The normalization of Quebec's external relations has
not, however, been accompanied by recognition, or full ac
ceptance, on the part of the federal government.

The open

diplomatic clashes and covert backstage manoeuverings (which
so often characterized and accompanied the international re
lations of Quebec from 1965-1970) might have been halted,
but the underlying issues which gave rise to those battles
continue.

The essential aspirations of Quebec have not

changed, nor has the character of Canadian federalism.

This chapter, it must be pointed out, has dealt largely
with the governmental process; that is, the international
relations of Quebec were viewed from the governmental, the
administrative-legislative point of view.

To say, therefore,

that 1965 was a watershed is to indicate only a change in
the governmental process, a change whereby the spacial trans
mission of culture was, relatively speaking,
lized.

institutiona

Administrative and legislative structures were

created, manpower employed, and monies allocated for the
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establishment and orderly functioning of Quebec relations
with other francophone societies.
The much broader political process of Quebec was not
mentioned.

In terms of 1965, this process, being composed

of different constituencies,

is less easily characterized

as having undergone any profound transformation.

While the

views of some political constituencies outpaced those of the
government, others invoked restraint.

But since it is in

the nature of democratically-elected parties, particularly
those of Canada, to tread as wide a path between extremes
as is politically possible, then one must assume that the
governmental process is a rough reflection of its environ
ment,

The views of such popular but divergent Quebec con

stituencies - such as those represented by Rene Levesque and
Jean Drapeau - are not so much reconciled as inevitably en
compassed by the governmental process.

This is only to say

that in a pluralist s o c i e t y - and Quebec is one - over
lapping occurs.
With respect to the international relations of Quebec,
the similar orientation of the Liberal and Union Nationale
governments of the period seems to imply a fairly broad con
sensus within the political process.

Tactics, strategies,

means to short-term goals, are always in dispute.
the realm of day-to-day politics.

This is

For a society to progress

and develop, however, there must exist general agreement as
to "ends" before meaningful action can be had.
such premises that governments proceed.

It is from

The premises upon
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which the governments of Quebec have acted are those of the
27
Quiet Revolution
: firstly, that cultural-national sur
vival is of value; secondly,

that, being endangered by tech

nology and the force of numbers, cultural-national survival
is better ensured by extroversion and cultural reinforcement
rather than by the introversion and isolation of the past;
thirdly, since the economy and culture are interdependent,
that a French-speaking economy is equally necessary;

fourthly,

that such economic and cultural particularism demands de28
centralization, or maximum autonomy for Quebec
; and lastly,
that the state is best equipped to act as agent in these
tasks, that is, that the state has a singularly positive role
29
to play

27

That is why, in reference to the discussion above, I 965
is described as a watershed for Quebec's governmental process
and not the political process.
It is more likely, and it is
generally accepted, that the transformation of the latter
was gradual and preceded that of the former.

28

This is according to the given general political struc
ture, federalism.
For some, particularly separatists, this'
is no problem.
But, while separatists may dominate certain
occupational and/or age groups, they do not comprise the
majority to date.
The argument advanced here is that the
governmental process is operating with a rough approximation
of the political mean in mind.

29

These ideational inputs from the political process oc
curred with the rise of Quebec's new middle class.
As the
politico-cultural pressures of the 1960's forced a growing
number of this self-assertive and informed group into the
provincial bureaucracy, the governmental organization changed.
The Department of Public Instruction is a case in point.
The
increasing secularization of society and of the political
process in particular prompted the creation of a Department
of Education.
Moreover, the infusion of lay officials brought
ideas which inclined to extend rather than to restrict, out
side contacts and co-operation.
This example only serves to emphasize the close
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Ail these have, of course, been mentioned.

They are a

subtle blend of short- and long-term goals, and thus constitute both means and ends.

The actions of Quebec to effect

those means, to achieve those ends, have also been recounted;
the drive for an international role - an expression of extroversion; the conclusion of cultural, technical and economic

co-operative programmes - a manifestation of cultural-economic
reinforcement.

But where external affairs are concerned,

attempts at legitimate decentralization have so far been in
vain.

The federal government maintains a firm position that

it possesses exclusive jurisdiction over all matters which
transcend Canadian boundaries, that Canada's international
personality and foreign policy are indivisible.

The federal

and Quebec governments thus confront one another with cul
tural and political arguments, in the hope of settling the
dispute once and for all on a constitutional level.

relationship existing between the political and governmental
processes, whereby the inputs from the former directly affect
the outputs of the latter.
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CHAPTER III

LEGAL, POLITICAL AND CULTURAL ARGUMENTS
The federal government, particularly under Pearson and
under his successor Trudeau, had not sat idle during the
1960's when the governmental and political processes of
Quebec were commanding great concern.

The Royal Commission

on Bilingualism and Biculturalism was established in 1963;
a policy of "co-operative federalism" was pursued until 1968 .
Both were designed to correct the inequities of Canada's
majority-minority (English-French) relations;

each attempted,

in its own way, to find solutions to the problems and accu
sations raised in the Quiet Revolution's aftermath.

Yet

while these, and other similar measures, sought to,establish
between Ottawa and Quebec more just modi vivendi et ooerandi
domestically, the question of external involvement was quite
another matter.

Indeed, the international implications which

flowed from Quebec's desire to use fully its legislative pre
rogatives, had no small impact upon the federal government.
Martin and Pearson, especially after I965, were more
emphatic on the bilingual and bicultural qualities of Cana
dian foreign policy;
...the government of Canada represents all of Canada
on the International plane and...we are anxious to use our
powers in the foreign affairs field to promote and further
the interests of all Canadians, including, of course, those
relating to our unique French-speaking heritage...(Martin
in Morrison, p.4).

-

78

-
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Francophone Africa was suddenly in the spotlight of
1
Canadian foreign aid .

Furthermore, in the face of accusa-

tions that the Department of External Affairs did not rep
resent the interests of French Canadians,

either at home or

abroad, the government moved to recruit more Québécois,

and

to transform the Department into a more truly bilingual
unit.

(On this development, see Gilles lalande;

ment of External Affairs and Biculturalism:

The Depart-

Diplomatic

Personnel and Language U s e ; and Federalism and International
Relations, p. 41-42.)

During this whole period, and particularly from 19&5
on, there existed a continuing see-saw effect between Ottawa
and Quebec over the letter's jurisdiction regarding treatymaking and treaty-implementation.

That Quebec's actions

were legally valid was denied by Ottawa as strongly as it
1

In the first half of the 1960's, $17 million was allo
cated to Commonwealth Africa, compared to Francophone
Africa's $1.5 million (CIDA Annual Review, 1969 ). Today,
1969-7 0 , the balance is sharply reversed with allocations
to Francophone Africa exceeding by $10 million those to Com
monwealth Africa ($34 and $24 millions respectively).
In
fact, bilateral aid allocations to this French-speaking area
far exceed that to any other region (except Asia as a whole)
and easily surpass the amounts given to any other two regions
combined - excluding, again, Asia (International Canada,
19 70 , p. 173-174).

That such federal attention is directly attributable to
events in Quebec is the view of several authors - Atkey,
Matthews, McWhinney and Morrison, Of these, Matthews is
most blunt:
...the extension of Canada's aid programme to French
speaking Africa was not motivated by a moral concern
for balancing the scales of justice.
Rather, this
decision was the by-product of a Canadian domestic
crisis.
Building bridges with la Francophonie was
seen as one way of dealing with the French Canadian
problem...(in International Journal, p. 125).
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was supported by Quebec.

Indeed, it was (and continues to

be) a debate of great importance, for, as Atkey points out,
"...at stake is not only the internal maintenance of the
Canadian federation, but the role of Canada in the inter
national community..

(in Confederation Challenge, vol. 2,

p. 153).
It may be useful therefore to put forward the main argu-

2
ments

on each side, not because the basic issue is capable

of a purely legal solution^ but rather for consideration as
to their contemporary relevance, legal authority and political viability.

One of the primary complications in this matter is the
virtual silence of the British North America (BNA) Act as to
3
the separation of treaty-making and treaty-implementation .
2

The politico-legal arguments (dealing with provincial
treaty-making and treaty-implementation) have been well docu
mented in the past few years, and it would serve little pur
pose in outlining them all here.
However, I refer the reader
to several of the better discussions, most of which are in
corporated by the following section;
Atkey in International
Journal; Lyon and Atkey in Canadian Constitutional Law in â
Modern Perspective; Laskin, Delisle, McWhinney (vol. 1) and
McWhinney, Atkey"Tvol. 2) in The Confederation Challenge.
For the positions of the federal and Quebec governments, see
Jean-Pierre Coyer in Commons Debates, (30 October 1969# p.
284-289); Federalism and International Relations, and its
supplement, Federalism and International Conferences on Eduoation (federal position); and Paul Gerin-Lajoie in Débats
(13 avril 1967* p./ 2173-2178), Document de Travail sur les
Relations avec l^Etranger, as well a s lLes Pouvoirs Extérieurs
du Quebec,

3

The importance of the BNA Act in the determination of
this question is underlined by the fact "that i n t e m a t i o n a l
law cannot by itself decide whether or not a member of a
federal union can make a treaty.
Int e m a t i onal law looks.
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Firstly, while section 132 does relate to federal obligations arising from treaties between the British Empire and

4
other foreign countries , it is contended that the Statute
of Westminister (1931) negated those necessary powers of
5
federal performance * Nowhere else does the BNA Act speak of
the making or implementation of treaties.

Thus, the gover

ning rule has become the principle laid down by the Labour
Conventions Case in 1937*
...for the purposes of.,.the distribution of legislative
powers between the Dominion and the Provinces, there is
no such thing as treaty legislation as such. The dis
tribution is based on classes of subjects; and as a
treaty deals with a particular class of subjects so
will the legislative power of performing it be ascer
tained...(Laskin in Confederation Challenge, vol. 1,
p. 109).
The exclusive right to implement treaties within its own
constitutionally-defined jurisdiction, has implied, to Quebec
in the first instance, to the constitution of the state in
question to determine the treaty-making capacity" (Federalism
and International Relations, p. 12). Both Quebec and Ottawa"
recognize thi s Z In fact, argues Brossard, nothing prevents
the federal government from granting wide powers to Canadian
provinces; international law could do nothing but accept any
change in the Canadian constitution (p. 227).
t

...The Parliament and Government of Canada shall have
all Powers necessary or proper for performing the Obli
gations of Canada or of any other Province thereof, as
Part of the British Empire, towards Foreign Countries,
arising under Treaties between the Empire and such
Foreign Countries...

)

...No Act of Parliament of the United Kingdom passed
after the commencement of this Act shall extend or be
deemed to extend, to a Dominion as part of the law of
that Dominion...(Statute of Westminster, 1931» section
4).
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at least, the equally legal right to negotiate and sign
treaties on provincial subjects.

This would seem to have

some validity, being as it is an extension of what Justice
Laskin calls "a long-established constitutional doctrine";
namely, that the distribution of legislative power between
Parliament and the provincial legislatures involves a cor
relative distribution of the accompanying executive or pre
rogative power (in Confederation Challenge, vol. 1, p.103).
This contention regarding the inseparability of execu
tive and legislative powers (i.e. of treaty-making and
-implementation) is further reinforced by the Liquidators
and Bonanza Creek oases of 1892 and 1916 respectively.
Whereas the former held that "the provinces were independent
and autonomous with the Lieutenant Governors having all the
powers of the royal prerogative necessary for provincial
purposes", the latter supplemented this by asserting that
"the distribution of powers under the grant of executive
authority follows the distribution under the grant of legis
lative powers in the BNA Act" (Atkey in International Journal,
p. 2 6 2 ).

Using such weapons, the Quebec government argues;

...qu'en matière d'exercice de la prérogative royale,
le texte des lettres patentes (^..émises au Gouverneurgénéral en 1947...) ne peut prévaloir à l'encontre de
la constitution et que celle-ci implique un partage de
la prérogative qui correspond au partage de la compétence législative.
^
...D'autre part, l'application a cette question des
principes généraux gouvernant l'exercice de la pré
rogative royale entraine la conclusion inévitable que
les provinces jouissent, en vertu de la constitution
actuelle, du droit de conclure des traités avec les
autres pays dans les matières qui sont de leur ressort
législatif...(Document de Travail, 1969, p. 18, p.

20-21 ).
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There are, in addition to these constitutional argu
ments, the recent precedents set by Quebec to which some
would point as suggesting that a de facto provincial com
petence in the international sphere is being created by evo
lution, or to which others would refer as establishing pro
vincial competence to make international agreements through
constitutional custom and practice.

This applies not only

to matters of competence, but to Quebec's international per6
sonality as well . Paul Gerin-Lajoie, having reviewed Que
bec's international initiatives, held such an opinion:
...Cette action internationale du Québec, déjà impor
tante, implique en quelque sorte que le Québec possède
une personnalité internationale.
Or, on a contesté,
non seulement que le Quebéc ait cette personnalité,
mais aussi qu'il puisse même en être doté un jour...
(Débats, 13 avril 196?, p. 2174).

The federal legal argument, on the other hand, appears
to be substantially better founded.

It too is based on the

devolution of foreign affairs power from Britain to Canada,
as the result of a series of Canadian external participations:
6

The recognition of one's international personality is
dependent upon the recognition of one's external sovereignty.
Brossard argues that Quebec participates in Canada's inter
national sovereignty;
/
,
...ce n'est pas l'Etat fédéral qui détient la^souve
raineté extérieure mais la fédération, c'est-à-^ire
l'ensemble constitué par l'Etat fédéral et les Etats
provinciaux...(p. 23I).
Although he does not treat Quebec's international personality
specifically, his argument leads logically to the conclusion
that if Quebec participates in Canada's international
sovereignty, then it surely also shares Canada's inter
national personality.
This conclusion is implicit.
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Washington Treaty (1871), Treaty of Versailles (1919),
Halibut Fisheries Treaty (1923), Imperial Conference (1926),
Statute of Westminister (1931)» and the declaration of war
(1939)•

As well, foreign affairs generally (by definition)

cannot be considered seriously among "matters of a merely
local or private nature" (BNA Act, section 92); furthermore,
since it is not "assigned exclusively to the legislatures of
the provinces", international relations, as a residual power,
falls to the federal government.

Section 3 of the Statute

of Westminster gives "the Parliament of a Dominion,..full
power to make laws having extraterritorial operation"; and
the Letters Patent of 19^7 would seem to include, among
other powers, the transfer of the treaty-making prerogative
(formerly vested exclusively in the Queen by section 9 of
the BNA Act) to the Governor-General (in Council),
The federal government also countered that argument of
Quebec which employed the Labour Conventions C a s e .

The judg

ment dealt not with treaty-making, but rather with the imple
mentation of treaties.

(The Judicial Committee of the Privy

Council clearly stated that it wished to express no opinion
on the treaty-making issue.
Journal, p. 266).

See Atkey in International

Federal advocates point to the decision

as handed down by the Supreme Court of Canada (before it was
appealed to the J.G.P.C.), to the belated dissent of Lord
Wright (who, as a member of the Privy Council, sat on the
case), and to Chief Justice Kerwin's statement (in the course
of his judgment in Francis v. The Queen, 1956) that "it may
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be necessary...to consider in the future the judgment of the
Judicial Committee in the Labour Conventions Case" (Laskin
in Confederation Challenge, vol. 1, p. 111).
However firm the federal position may be when drawing
upon internal strengths, it is buttressed further by referen
ces to international law.

Here, "recognition" plays a large

role; and it was the federal government, not provincial
governments, that was recognized by other sovereign states
as having power to conduct foreign affairs - first by Britain,
then by the United States, by others, by the United Nations,
It is a position which has gone, until recently, unchallenged
at home and unchallenged abroad.

There is, as well, the un

written legal rule which regards the central government of
a federation as responsible for any default on an international
agreement, whether that tort is committed by the central
government, or by a component unit.

According to federal

proponents, this places Ottawa in a potentially unfair posi
tion, particularly if Ottawa is to be required to remedy pro
vincial breaches of international agreements over which it
has no control.

Moreover, were such a provincial default to

occur, it would seriously detract from Canada's international
integrity.

The federal government, they conclude, by shoul-

the responsibility, must also control the relations (Atkey
^ 7
in International Journal, p. 267) .
7

Quebec proponents use this same argument. If the p r o 
vinces possessed the necessary executive (treaty-making)
power to coincide with the present legislative (treatyimplementation) powers, then not only would Canada be
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Yet despite the federal government's stronger legal
argumentation, there is no rigidity about its conclusions.
Indeed, they are quite flexible, game for negotiation, open
for revision.

Their proposals for co-operation present a

stark reminder that the issue's solution lies not in legali
ties, but rather in the politics of federal-provincial (or
specifically Ottawa-Quebec) relations:

...neither centralization to the exclusion of other
priorities nor decentralization to the point of dis
solution is desirable or necessary. What is of parti
cular importance is to improve and extend the present
framework, on the basis of the very broad range of
options which is available...
...Within these limits, it is not the intention of
the Government to fix upon or crystallize any one
formula for improvement or adjustment in existing
arrangements. Those which are referred to above (in
the text) are open to consideration and it is the
Government's hope that they will receive close atten
tion and examination in all interested quarters.
For
its part, the Government will be prepared to consider
the further development of any such procedures which
are found to be of general interest, as well as al
ternatives which may be proposed, with a view to
achieving a fully effective design for future co
operation...(Federalism and International Relations,
p. 48).

Indeed, both federal and provincial legal arguments lead

8
away from rather than toward the judicial system , placing
the solution within the political arena.
indemnified against such provincial torts, but it would also
participate more fully in international affairs (Brossard
et al., p. 85).
8
This is not surprising when one considers the suspicion
with which provincial governments view the constitutional
arbiter, the Supreme Court of Canada.
At the same time,
however, the federal government has no assurance t h a t , i f
the question were put before the Court, a decision (or
opinion) favourable to Ottawa would be made.
The decision,
according to Peyton Lyon, could easily go either way (Le
Devoir, 20 mars 1967» p. 4).
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Quebec's political objectives are shaped fundamentally
by its cultural-national particularisme, by the value placed
upon those particularisms, and therefore upon their survival;
...We believe that there is in Canada, in a sociological
sense, a nation of French speech, whose home is in Que
bec. This nation has every intention of continuing
its self-assertion by obtaining...all the instruments
required for its development.
Specifically...as the mainstay of a nation, (Quebec)
wants free rein to make its own decisions affecting the
growth of its citizens as human beings...their economic
development...their cultural fulfilment...and the pre
sence abroad of the Quebec community.
To this end, the new Quebec government is committed
to the fundamental task of obtaining legal and poli
tical recognition of the French Canadian nation...
(Statement:
Tax Structure Committee, 19&6, p. 2-3).
...As French speaking Canadians, we have the unshakable
conviction that we form a viable community sharing one
of the greatest cultures in the western world, speaking
an int e m a t i onal language and endowed with vast human
potentialities.
That is why, despite all difficulties,
we are resolved to preserve our identity.,.(Preliminary
Statement: Confederation of Tomorrow Conference, 1^67,

pTTT

La survivance thus lies behind one of Quebec's prime poli
tical objectives, decentralization.

Each successive Quebec

government since 1867 has remained "consistently attached to
a strict federalism as a protector of its own culture and the
cultural dualism of Canada.

(Each) has been the chief cita

del of resistance to centralizing conceptions and homogeni
zing tendencies" (Brady, in Meekison, p. 338).
While, historically, Quebec has always sought to guard
its domestic provincial autonomy against federal encroach
ments, external affairs is presently in the foreground of
that vigil.

The age of technique has altered the content and

conduct of international relations and these changes, in turn.
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affect not only Canadian federal-provincial relations, but
threaten as well la survivance.
Increasingly, since the second world war, international
relations has shifted its focus in terms of subject matter.
More and more it deals with topics which, in Canada's case,
are assigned to provincial jurisdiction - education, culture,
labour, health, etc. - and if the federal government were to
ignore this large and growing sector of international acti
vities, Canada would be harnessed with an ever-narrowing
external role.

Those benefits which co-operation and mutual

development bring, would no doubt be lost.

Yet, if the

federal government were to treat all international activities,
including these, as matters of its own exclusive jurisdiction,
it could not help but reshape, if only by influence, the
domestic distribution of powers and thus the federal structure,
From a constitutional point of view, and within the context of
Quebec's devotion to decentralization (or the minimum objective of strict federalism), this is totally unacceptable:
...Le fait...que les relations extérieures aient été
généralement confiées au gouvernement central à l'époque
ou ces relations ne se rapportaient qu'à la paix et à
la guerre ou aux échanges commerciaux ne veut pas dire
grand'chose aujourd'hui, alors que ces relations con
cernent de plus en plus l'éducation, la culture et les
affaires sociales...(Document de Travail, 1969, p. 34).
...Now most of these sectors are a provincial responsibility, and Quebec obviously cannot allow them to be
dealt with internationally by the federal government
alone.
The content of agreements in these fields has
such a close bearing on the implementation of day-today policies that, if the federal government were to
have a monopoly on international affairs, it would
gradually take over de facto - if not de jure - internal
jurisdiction over matters which constitutionally, do
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not fall within its competence...(Brief on the Con
stitution, 1968 , p. 14).
It is all the more unacceptable when consideration is
given to the inefficient and artificial nature of boundaries
within the modern world.

If technology, through the crea

tion of vast new networks of communications, has webbed more
intricately the relations among governments and peoples, it
has also, by the same means, facilitated informal penetra
tion.

Technology has fostered the proliferation of inter

national actors and agents, and has provided all with some
degree of informal access.

Thus, in a period of increasing

informal access, as the traditional lines between states be
come more blurred and as the controls of movement across and
within boundaries become more difficult,
...a situation sometimes develops in which the critical
boundary may not be the geographical one but one de
fined by the circumstances of the market, the location
of the adherents of an opposing ideology, the location
of a given race or religious group, (etc.)...(Scott,
1965 , p. 168 ).
This, precisely, is Quebec's argument;
graphical boundary is now irrelevant.

that the geo

Instead, the critical

line of demarcation follows closely the subject-matters of
jurisdictional competence,

for, in the modern world, exter9
nal-internal dichotomies are inapplicable .

9

The inextricable relationship between external and
domestic affairs is often used to support Quebec's international ambitions.
Since both jurisdictions share one and
the same boundary (however tenuous that line may be), to
affect one is necessarily to affect the other.
Jean-Marc
Leger repeatedly points this out;
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The salience of such arguments for Quebec is reinforced
by their dual nature;

the boundary of exclusive jurisdic

tion for the government of Quebec coincides with the equally
critical boundary of the cultural-national community.
federalism is one means to survival.

Strict

Not only must the fe-

deral government cease to encompass provincial areas on the
international plane, but it must also cease to represent, or
to speak on behalf of, French Canada abroad.

As so many

Quebec governments have stated, Quebec - not Ottawa - is the

10
mainstay of the French Canadian community

.

This latter assertion stems from both historical and
current developments whereby French Canadians ended their
"long search for a fatherland" (Brunet in Russell, p. 47-60).
During the Quiet Revolution Québécois particularly identified
...La frontière est d'ailleurs de plus en plus tenue
entre ce qui appartient au domaine intérieur et ce qui
relève de la politique étrangère;
celle-ci tend à
n'être pas seulement un prolongement mais un élément
de la politique intérieure et, dans le cas des fédéra
tions, risque d'être un puissant instrument de centra
lisation. ..(Le Devoir, 23 juin I96 7 , p. 4).
...A une époque où la frontière est imprécise, sinon
inexistante, entre "affaires internes" et "affaires
internationales", l'exercice réel des compétences
attachées h l'autonomie suppose la prolongation de ces
compétences sur le plan extérieur; autrement, 1'auto
nomie interne elle-méme ne tarde pas a l^bre affaiblie
et, bientôt, menacée...(Le Devoir, 4 octobre I968, p. 4)
10

The distinction between French Canada and Quebec "may
seem pedantic, but it is most assuredly not.
It is, indeed,
the very essence of the current debate..." (Cook, 19^1, p.
7 0 ). Ramsay Cook touches on this debate throughout two
chapters, "French Canada and Confederation; The Quest for
Equality" and "Quebec; Federalism or Independence?" (1971»
p. 68-81 and p. 82-98 respectively).
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themselves increasingly with the state of Quebec as the sole
provider of French Canadian opportunities on a non-discriminatory basis.
Canada.

Ottawa was left as the capital of English

Quebec's nationalist historians point to the rep-

resentation of French Canadians in federal employment statistics and percentages, and to the historical pro-English
performance of the central government (especially in times of
crisis) as having rendered Ottawa ineligible for that leader
ship role.

Indeed, the Preliminary Report of the Royal Com-

raission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism confirmed this
lack of identification by French Canadians with Ottawa;
...Our first contacts with French-speaking Canada did
not reveal anything we had not anticipated, unless it
was the extreme suspicion with which a large part of
Quebec looks on anything that is initiated by Ottawa,
and its considerable scepticism as to English Canada's
ability and desire to understand French Canada.
Some
sàid irritably:
"We have been submitting our claims
for thirty, fifty and even a hundred years, and there
have never been any results - why should we begin again
now?"
(p. 28).
The force of such popular historical interpretations - inter
pretations which successive Quebec leaders have not been re
luctant to accept - thus granted to the government of Quebec,
the duty of ensuring and providing for the growth and fulfilment of the French Canadian collectivity.
In this light, the denial of a federal role is at once
an assertion that Quebec, in the exercise of its full legislative competence, be the single, direct and legitimate
spokesman for that cultural-national community.

Demands for

a "special status" at home have thereby become claims for a
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"special status" abroad;
...if Quebec is the prime political structure for French
Canada's destiny, there is no reason by this province's
government should not assume international responsibi
lities to the extent that external factors may affect
its destiny...(Painchaud in Clarkson, p. 8 6 ).
And, as it is argued, if this should be the case gene
rally, it should most certainly be the rule where cultural11
national life-lines are concerned
;
...jamais nous ne lâcherons quand il s'agit de relations
dans le domaine de l'éducation et, particulièrement,
avec la francophonie, car nous ne voulons pas laisser
à Ottawa...le contrôle de l'oxygène francophone dont
nous avons besoin pour vivre...(Daniel Johnson; Le
Devoir, 26 septembre 196 8 , p. 2) 12

11

Claude Ryan, in an editorial (Le Devoir, 14 septembre
1968), puts forth this exact case;
...Le gouvernement du Québec, en raison de la composi
tion de sa population et de,l'histoire même du dernier
siècle, a une responsabilité toute spéciale à l'endroit
de l'épanouissement de la vie française en Amérique du
Nord.
Chargé de responsabilités exclusives dans des
domaines aussi vitaux que l'éducation, le bien-être,
les relations de travail, la justice, le^développement
économique et social, il éprouve spontanément, dès qu'il
veut respirer, le besoin d'être en rapport avec le pays
qui incarne par excellence la vie française.
Il veut
pouvoir communiquer directement avec ce pays.
Il lui
répugne de devoir se prêter, dans le développement de
ces rapports, à la surveillance jalouse d'une bellemère, meme si celle-ci est très bien disposée...(p. 4).

12

Bertrand has made a similar assertion.
In the Document
de Travail (p. 10), the Quebec government submits that, parti
cularly in the field of education (and education plays a
large part in Quebec's external relations), only the provin
cial government can effect competent international agreements;
...le gouvernement du Québec doit y être directement
partie et...il ne peut accepter d'y participer par
l'intermédiaire du gouvernement fédéral.
Tous ces
échanges exigent une connaissance intime de 1 'appareil
gouvernemental et des institutions d'enseignement.
Il
s'agit d'abord d 'évaluer les besoins, puis de fixer des
priorités et, pour cela, d'engager des discussions avec
les ministères et les institutions d'enseignement; il
faut ensuite negoçier le tout, annuellement, avec les
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While Quebec was demanding the recognition of its right
as sole spokesman for the French Canadian community, and
while it argued for various forms of "special status" at
home and abroad, it became increasingly important for that
government to exercise more fully that right.

In the post

war years - when the evolution of political thought was
firmly establishing the Quebec state as a point of political
reference for French Canadians, when the Quiet Revolution
was re-defining la survivance, when demands for full legis
lative competence were making "special status" more attractive, when the content of international relations was touching
more closely upon the nerves of provincial jurisdiction in the midst of all these activities, the relationship between la survivance and Quebec's need to engage in external
relations became increasingly apparent.

The same technology

which had opened the world to Quebec had simultaneously opened
Quebec to the world, and specifically to its North American
English-speaking environment.
Immediately, a variety of implications became evident to
Québécois*

sociologically, their traditional protective way

of life was disintegrating;

demographioally, they comprised

a tiny group in comparison with the North American Englishspeaking community;

economically, their industrial society,

created by aliens, reflected none of their own particular

autorités françaises; il faut enfin pourvoir aux dé
penses et évaluer les résultats.
Or, seul le gouverne
ment du Québec est compétent, en droit et en fait, pour
remplir cette tâche...
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and politically, the 186? constitution did

not grant the protection they had long anticipated.

Premier

Johnson, in reviewing these "obstacles to full self-achievement", was, perhaps correctly, pessimistic;
...our nation no longer has a choice.
If it passively
accepts the present situation, it will inevitably take
the road to slow but sure assimilation into the great
North American mass...(Prel iminary S tatement; Confederaof Tomorrow Conference, 1967, p« 4-5)*
Given its numerical size and the relative strength of
its economy, the French Canadian community could never hope
to maintain its position within, let alone dominate, the
patterns of North American cultural communications.
vivance demanded cultural reinforcement.

La sur

External relations

thus became politically an objective, culturally an imperative,
Several papers presented at the Montreal conference of Les
Etats-Généraux make this quite clear;
...French Canadians are and will be more and more sub
mitted to massive influence from the United States in
every respect of their life, their work, their thought.
From this it follows that prompt and rapid development
of close relationships with other French-speaking coun
tries is an urgent necessity...
...it is no exaggeration to affirm that the entry of
French Canada into the Francophone world has become a
fundamental condition, a sine qua n o n , of survival.
Yesterday, this could have been regarded simply as
desirable or useful; today, it is necessary, it is
vitally desirable...
...it is necessary also to revive our cultural heritage
and to restore our language, and to open ourselves in
French to the modern world...(in Morrison, p. 22-23)•

This cultural imperative has strongly conditioned the
behaviour of Quebec governments in the 1960's, particularly
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their determination to assume full legislative and administrative responsibilities, whether those responsibilities lay
in the domestic or in the external domain.

The international

relations of Quebec can certainly be seen in this light.

It

is an attempt to institutionalize and, in the federal-provincial arena, to regularize Quebec's spacial transmission of
French Canadian culture; it is an attempt to secure a much
needed, much desired cultural reinforcement by co-operation
and in association not only with the cultural motherland
France, but also with other less-developed francophone socie
ties.

To Quebec, it is a question of breaking out of its

previously self-imposed isolation wherein stagnation and assi
milation are inevitably perceived; it is a question of extro
version, modernization and societal self-development (l'épa
nouissement) while preserving and developing all that is
culturally valuable.
In defence of Quebec's international role, French Cana
dian advocates have employed Canadian political, technological
and cultural arguments.

Those used by Daniel Johnson, the
13
most ardent and flamboyant advocate, combine all three
:
...II n'y a pas d'égalité possible pour la communauté
française au Canada si le Québec ne peut pas negoçier
librement les accords nécessaires à la preservation de
13

The speeches of Liberal Paul Gerin-Lajoie and of the
Union Nationale's Marcel Masse express strikingly similar
sentiments;
^
^
...De plus, dans un monde où les frontières existent de
moins en moins, il est évident que notre épanouissement
social et culturel exige que nous exprimions nous-mémes
sur le plan international, que nous développions des
contacts et des échanges, que nous nous donnions des
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son heritage particulier.^ II n'y a pas d'égalité pos
sible pour une communauté nationale,qui se trouve placée
sous la dépendance d'une autre^dans les domaines qui
mettent en jeu son existence même...Dans le passé le
Québec a pu préserver son heritage culturel grâce k
isolement relatif.
Cet isolement n'est plus possible
aujourd'hui.
Le temps est venu pour nous de nouer des
contacts beaucoup plus étroits avec la France et les
autres pays francophones du monde.
Ce n'est pas un
caprice juridique, c'est^un nécessite vitale...La nation
n'est pas un cercle ferme...C'est une communauté de
langue et de culture qui est ouverte par conséquent a
tous ceux qui ont part à cette langue et à cette culture,
quelle soit leur origine ethnique...(Le Devoir, 26 juin
1967, p. 1-2).

In addition, Louis Sabourin, keeping in mind the close re
lationship between Quebec's culture and its economy, adds the
following economically-oriented reasoning:
dimensions nouvelles, des possibilités d'action plus
étendues tant sur le plan individuel que collectif.
Pour protéger notre identité québécoise et canadiennefrançaise, nous nous sommes autrefois repliés sur nousmâmes.
Pour l'épanouir, il nous faut aujourd'hui nous
ouvrir sur le monde...(Gerin-Lajoie; Débats, 13 avril
19 6 7 , p. 2176).
...Mais dans ce monde qui marche irrémédiablement vers
l'unité d'action, il demeure quand même indispensable
de sauvegarder les particularismes, principalement d'
ordre culturel et sociologique^ qui forment l'une des
grandes richesses de 1 'humanité. Voilà pourquoi aucun
peuple et, c'est le cas du peuple québécois, ne peut
s'en remettre entièrement pour l'image qu'on projette
de lui à l'extérieur à une autorité qui n'a jamais su
le refléter fidèlement dans so% essence et dans ses
caractéristiques propres. Les Etats fédératifs sont souvent crées dans le but de protéger la diversité culturelle de leurs habitants. Mais l'expérience du passé,
en ce qui nous concerne, nous indique clairement que la
communauté québécoise doit avoir certaines fenêtres sur
le monde extérieur pour s'acquitter de toutes ses
obligations internes et pour assurer son épanouissement,
même si elle ne jouit pas de la souveraineté complète
...(Le Devoir, 23 juin I967, p. 3).
This latter statement by Masse is part of a speech, the text
of which may be found in Journal of Canadian Studies, vol. 2,
no. 3, p. 40-45.
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...the government (of Quebec) must make sure that the
million and a half young people who will look for jobs
in the next fifteen years will be able to work in
their language. Most private corporations are not yet
able to create a French-speaking milieu de travail for
they import most of their scientific know-how from the
United States and English Canada. It is then up to the
government of Quebec to try to counter-balance such a
trend. The only way to do so is to establish more ex
changes with French-speaking countries which can pro
vide such scientific and technical knowledge...(in
Clarkson, p. 100),
Nevertheless, whatever arguments are brought to bear whether cultural, political, legal, technological, or eco
nomic - the issue itself has evolved from one of "institu
tionalization" to one of "legitimization". The external
activities of Quebec, particularly from 1965 onward, have
placed that government firmly on the international scene.
The Department of Intergovernmental Affairs, numerous cul
tural, economic, educational and technical programmes of
co-operation, and Quebec's participation on several inter
national or intergovernmental bodies and commissions, have
virtually assured Quebec an international role in practice,
if not in theory.
What remains to be settled is a question of degree, both
in the quantity and in the quality of Quebec's international
relations. Given the fluid nature of Quebec provincial and
Canadian federal politics,

it is a question which may con

ceivably never be answered, but for which in the continuing
constitutional conference, and in day-to-day federal-pro
vincial relations, a solution is constantly being sought.
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CONCLUSION
Preservation of the French Canadian culture and nation
has been, historically, a prime concern. Since the Conquest
and for almost two centuries thereafter, the French Canadian
Catholic Church has been, by virtue of its dominant position
in Quebec's society, the receptacle of this culture and thus
the guarantor of national survival. Language, culture, laws,
general customs and ecclesiastical principles were freely
interwoven by the Church to form the ideology of survival.
Defensive isolation was the keystone. The state was an
insignificant actor, for, with the Church ("the motherinstitution of public institutions") serving as cultural re
pository, there was no necessity for interventional assis
tance; nor was the political climate appropriate, given
Quebec's general conservative nature, for the state to
assume a positive role.
The urbanization and accompanying secularization of
Quebec altered this pattern. It was particularly under the
accelerated technological advances of post-war Quebec that
the power and relevance of the Church rapidly dissipated,
and, in part by its own acquiescance,

in part by public

1

2

pressure , the Church gradually withdrew

from many

1
Mason Wade wrote in the mid-1950's of this growing pub
lic pressure *
...All French Canadians are conscious of the great debt
they owe to their clergy for ensuring cultural survival
in the post-conquest period, though there is a growing

—

98 “
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nonecolesiastioal, societal functions.
In the critical area of cultural-national preservation,
the state assumed the leading role. But the methods by
which the state government attempted to sustain culturalnational integrity were not those of the Church. A twentieth
century approach to the twentieth century technologicallyinspired assimilative threats was needed. Defensive tactics
of cultural isolation were now inapplicable, and the finan
cial, administrative and moral supports of the state were
given to an extroverted development encompassing all areas

3
of provincial jurisdiction

s

group today who feel that this debt has been abundantly
repaid and that the clergy should abandon many of their
traditional activities now that there are plenty of
trained laymen available to fulfil these nonclerical
functions...(in Park, p. 369).
2

The Church's withdrawal was certainly not total, nor
did the state seek to exclude it completely. Left-right and
seoular-sacral debates throughout the hierarchical structure
of the Church (although more noticeable amongst the lower
ranks of young clerics) contributed to its "hesitant and
divided" nature (Corbett, p. 4), and thus to its relegation
to one aspect of the larger politico-socio-economic complex.
At the same time, and for the first time, a great and grow
ing number of the lay middle class is concerned about cul
tural issues and are pursuing solutions beyond the aegis of
that Church. This is no more than the natural functioning
of a pluralist society.
The Church, however, is still a societal participant,
directing its present attentions more towards the field of
social action. For a current examination of the Church today
and of its "thorough-going metamorphosis", see Norbert

Lacoste, "A Mobile Church for a Mobile People" in Mann, vol.
1, p. 295-3 0 1 .
3
The means of course changed with the ends; as la survi
vance was re-defined, so were government policies. The
Premiership of Jean Lesage was the first where government
policies issued in large part frwn the Quiet Revolution. He
wrote of the attitudinal change toward cultural-national
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...nous devons non seulement sauvegarder notre identité
ethnique, mais nous devons trouver les moyens qui per
mettront à notre langue et à notre culture de s'épanouir
...nous croyons que la cause de l'avancement de notre
minorité nationale dans tous les domaines ne sera bien
servie^que si le gouvernement du Québec - la seule pro
vince à prédominance canadienne-française - adopte ce
que j'appellerais une politique globale, en ne négli
geant de cette façon aucun des domaines d'activité
capables de favoriser l'épanouissement économique, so
cial et culturel de notre groupe ethnique...(Un Québec
Fo r t , p. 15-16).
The placing of education Under state control was only
an initial step towards 1' épanouissement des Québécois. It
did not per se ensure cultural development and enrichment,
for the sources of French cultural strength lay beyond the
borders of Quebec and beyond the borders of Canada and English-speaking North America. By the same technological means
which permitted the anglophone Culture to converge on Quebec,
Quebec in turn, could reach cultural allies. Inter-societal
cultural transmission was a sine qua non for l'épanouisse
ment, and Quebec thus sought to establish relations (parti
cularly and initially in the cultural-educational fields)
with francophone societies abroad.
survival, that attitudinal change which formed the basis of
his government's approach :
...il n'est pas question de survivre, mais de V I V R E i Et
vivre, c'est lutter...
...La population québécoise^vivait jadis dans l'isole
ment, dans son petit monde a elle et dans le sentiment
que "le Canada" s'arrêtait aux frontières de sa province; aujourd'hui, la province est ouverte sur le
reste du pays et le reste du monde...Plus que jamais,
elle tient à ses caractères propres, à sa culture, sa ^
langue et sa religion. D'une manière, elle s'est engagée
dans un processus d'affirmation de soi pour laquelle
elle entend vivre désormais comme un peuple adulte dans
un monde de nations souveraines,..la population du Qué
bec ne veut plus se contenter d'être la gardienne de
cette culture : elle veut en devenir le symbole vivant
...(Un Québec Fort, p. 10-11).
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Naturally, France held a fundamental position within
this framework. It was the cultural fountainhead;

its

schools, its economy, its literati were all well established;
they enjoyed a considerable reputation. Consequently, France
provided the much-needed initial francophone reinforcement.
Nevertheless, as early as I 96 I, Francophone Africa was
viewed as an important factor in the self-definition of
Québécois. Relations with these newly independent states
would offer cultural stimulation and strength, and would
provide "la chance de faire connaître notre culture par les
autres" (Un Québec F o r t , p. I 3 )• Most important, however,
was that opportunity which Francophone Africa afforded Que
bec *
...l'élément français du Canada peut, s'il le veut,
devenir un important trait d'union entre les pays oc
cidentaux et ceux qui appartiennent à ce que nous
appelons le tiers-monde. Un grand nombre de ces pays
sont d'expression française - je pense ici aux nouveaux
Ëtats d'Afrique - et ils ont besoin de 1'appui culturel
qt technique du Canada français. Tous ces nouveaux
Etats ne partagent pas le même degré d'industrialisa
tion et le même niveau de vie, mais tous, à cause de
leur situation nouvelle et à^cause de leur indépendance
récente, sentent la nécessité de frôler les coudes des
nations qui peuvent les comprendre. Il est indéniable
que le Canada français appartient a ce groupe...(Un
Québec F o r t , p. 13)•
Francophone Africa provided Quebec with the opportunity to
make an original contribution to the human race. In so doing.
Francophone Africa provided a raison d'etre.

Given the new and acute assimilative threats of the
technological age, given the redefinition of the means and
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ends of cultural-national survival, and given the govern4
m e n t *8 determination to pursue on its own , in all ways, the
achievement of those means and ends, it was inevitable that
Quebec should seek to institutionalize not only the temporal
transmission, but the spacial transmission of culture as
well. The attempt to effect an international role was the
logical next-step in the government's drive to develop Que
bec society, culturally and economically, by exercising
fully its legislative and administrative prerogatives.
Changes in the content and conduct of international rela
tions, and the virtual silence of the British North America
Act specifically on external affairs, facilitated this step
and provided Quebec with some basis for argumentation.
Throughout the 1960's, but particularly from 1965-1970,
the government of Quebec made increasingly frequent forrays
into the external arena and there sought to establish pro
grammes of co-operation and exchange with other Frenchspeaking states. To date, thousands of Québécois have parti
cipated in such programmes; several hundred others have

5
served on the administrative commissions and bodies . Quebec
4

Jean Lesage, in his speeches, often spoke of the neces
sity for Quebec to count only on itself i
...il y a un accord complet quant k la nécessité pour
la population du Québec de compter sur elle-même si elle
veut voir ses espoirs et ses aspirations réalisés pleine,
ment et convenablement...Dans la découverte et dans
l'application de ces moyens (de nous épanouir), nous
faisons face à des problèmes qui nous sont propres et
nous savons qu'en dernière analyse, c'est presque tou
jours par nos propres énergies que nous les résoudrons.
Dans ce domaine, nous voulons surtout nous aider nousmêmes ...(Un Québec For t , p. 12 and p. 15).
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operates three Deïégations-Générales (New York, London and
Paris), six Bureaux économiques (Milan, Chicago, Boston,
Dallas, Los Angeles, Dusseldorf), and a Mission permanent
pour le Quebec en Louisiane. The creation in I967 of the
Department of Intergovernmental Affairs signaled, for all
provincial purposes, the institutionalization of the inter
national relations of Quebec. Thereafter, Quebec's external
activities were co-ordinated and controlled by one central,
administrative agency.

The quantity and scope of Quebec's international acti
vities seem to have assured that province of an international
role. Indeed, its degree of involvement on the international
plane presents a considerable barrier to the path of retreat.
Furthermore, the continued allocation of monies, the employ
ment of manpower and the creation of administrative bodies
speak themselves of a certain determination in policy whereby
Quebec is resolved to maintain transnational relations.
Such factors lead one to the conclusion that the international relations of Quebec is a permanent feature on the
Canadian scene. In this sense, it is institutionalized. Moreover, because those relations deal largely with cultural,
educational, and socio-economic affairs, and because they are
5

Chapter II of the Document de Travail (p. 6- 1 3 ) gives
an overall picture,of Quebec's international involvement up
to February 1969* Etudes Internationales, a quarterly publi
cation of the Centre Québécois de Relations Internationales,
provides current documentation of the int ernational relations of Quebec.
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conducted within a francophone framework, one can also speak
of Quebec's institutionalization of the spacial transmission
of culture.
In terms of federal-provincial relations, what was
originally a bitter and controversial issue has become more
long-term and thus low-key. The international relations of
Quebec is presently a political reality; its existence is
6
no longer at stake . Instead, the debate has shifted in
creasingly to one of a mutually-acceptable legitimization,
and its forum has become the constitutional conference.
Here, both the standardization (or institutionalization)
of Quebec's relations and the intervention of short-term
7
political phenomena account for the issue's less-thanurgent priority. In fact, at the most recent constitutional
conference in Victoria, June 1971, the focus was on social
welfare. Neither in the final communiqué, nor in the consti
tutional charter, was external affairs discussed (Le Devoir,
g—
18 juin 1971, p. 5; and 19 juin 1971, p. 9 respectively)
6

.

Marcel Cadieux, a prominent federal figure (formerly
Under Secretary of State for External Affairs and now Cana
dian Ambassador to the United States), holds this very
opinion :
...Quebec's presence on the world scene is, I believe,
not merely a fact; it is an obvious fact. That Quebec
must be more active on that scene also appears obvious
to me. The real problem is how Quebec is to play its
role in the world...(in Meekison, p. 379)•

7

The polarized Quebec election of April 1970, the FLQ
crisis in the fall, and the general unhealthy state of the
Canadian economy all made great demands on both federal and
provincial governments.

8

According to Claude Lemelin, however, there were rumours
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Perhaps a more important factor has been "de-symboliza~
tion". The election of Robert Bourassa effected a change in
emphasis and style. Economic and fiscal questions were given
top priority, and federal advantages stressed. The quest for
governmental symbols as ends in themselves - a quest which
seemed to characterize the Ottawa-Quebec dispute in the

1960*8 - was "consciously downplayed" (McWhinney in Confederation Challenge, vol. 2, p. I4l).
All these factors have combined to defuse what was once
an explosive issue. Together, they account for the relatively
more pragmatic approach being taken by both Ottawa and Quebec. But, while the issue of Quebec's international rela
tions may have been relegated to a longer-term, lower-key
concern, it remains nevertheless without a solution. It is
unlikely that the federal government will concede to Quebec
the rights to represent itself and to negotiate and sign
agreements on its own initiative, in all matters of provin
cial jurisdiction. It is equally unlikely that Quebec will
concede to the federal government an exclusive jurisdiction
in international affairs. There is, of course, a myriad of
compromise positions and the attainment of the most suitable
may involve a much lengthier process of negotiation than is
presently envisaged.

that the federal government would submit a text calling for
the recognition of its exclusive competence in international
affairs (Le Devoir, 11 juin 1971, p. 4). Such a text did not
appear.
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